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 Abstract: This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of 
financial cooperatives (FC). The first part presents a theoretical framework rooted in 
principles of transaction cost economics (TCE) that seeks to explain empirical 
regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. The second part is an empirical 
study that compares X-efficiency between members of the Quebec Desjardins 
movement (DM) and the United States Credit Union system (USCU), the first 
organized as a tight network of institutions and the second composed largely by 
independent institutions with few ties. The fundamental proposition is that networks, 
are a superior form of governance mechanism (over markets and mergers) for 
relatively wide and relevant ranges of contractual hazard and size of the institutions. 
Further, that networks provide substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when 
size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms, discouraging subgoal 
pursuits and expense preferences by agents, both occurring in large FC. The theory 
allows us to generate a set of testable hypothesis of which we highlight three: i) For 
small FC, differences in efficiency will be relatively small, if any. ii) Large institutions 
should display systematically lower efficiency than similar sized FC members of 
strategic networks. iii) Networks should display lower variance in the size as well as 
in performance indicators. Throughout, empirical results are consistent with our 
central theoretical proposition. 
 
Résumé: Cet article présente une étude de l’organisation économique de systèmes 
de coopératives financières. La première section présente un cadre théorique basé 
sur la théorie des coûts de transactions qui tente d’expliquer des récurrences 
empiriques observables dans les systèmes de coopératives financières dans le 
monde. La deuxième section est une étude empirique qui compare l’efficacité des 
coopératives financières du Mouvement Desjardins du Québec et des “credit unions” 
Américaines. Le premier réseau est fortement intégré, alors que le second est 
composé principalement d’institutions indépendantes reliées seulement par quelques 
liens. La proposition fondamentale est qu’une intégration accrue permet d’atteindre 
une forme supérieure de gouvernance (en comparaison avec le marché ou les 
fusions) pour une gamme relativement large de risque contractuel et de taille des 
institutions. De plus, les réseaux constituent un substitut, basé sur la hiérarchie, aux 
mécanismes de contrôle lorsque la taille de l’institution affaiblit les mécanismes de 
gouvernance interne, décourageant la poursuite des objectifs secondaires et la 
préférence pour certaines dépenses des agents, deux phénomènes observés dans 
les grandes coopératives financières. La théorie nous permet de générer un 
ensemble d’hypothèses vérifiables. Nous en soulignons trois: i) Pour les petites 
coopératives financières, les différences d’efficacité seront relativement petites. ii) 
Les grandes institutions indépendantes devraient présenter une efficacité moindre 
que les institutions de taille comparable membres d’un réseau stratégique. iii) Les 
institutions membres d’un réseaux devraient présenter une moindre variance en taille 
et en efficacité. Nos résultats empiriques confirment notre proposition théorique 
centrale. 
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JEL Classification: G2, G3 1 Introduction
This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of ﬁnancial cooperatives (FC). It
consists of two parts. The ﬁrst, presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost
economics (TCE). There, we seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide.
In particular, explain integration of large numbers of FC into networks that present speciﬁc features common
in several countries. The second, consists of an empirical study that compares two particular systems of
FC, the United States Credit Union (USCU) system and the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM). The ﬁrst
organized as a loose arrangement with very low level of integration and the second integrated into a tightly
organized (strategic) network.12
Elsewhere ([Fischer, 2000], [Fischer, 2002]) it was argued, based on an analysis of 18 cases of ”mature”
FC systems, that there exist two dominant models of ”macro” governance of FC systems. The models
present certain constant characteristics in terms of governance across groups of countries. The systems of
FC operating as networks appear to display either equal or superior (but not inferior) performance that those
operating under a looser organization (non-network). As measures of performance, variables such as market
penetration in terms of population and ﬁnancial assets, stability of the system, level of services provided
to members, were used. As could be expected, the network did not outperform the non-network in every
measure, but under no measure was the result reversed. The diﬀerence of performance does not appear
to be attributable to cultural, religious, or political factors, as was argued elsewhere [MacPherson, 1998].
Rather, the diﬀerence in performance appears to be related to governance. In this paper we focus on
networks of depository type of mutual intermediaries (ﬁnancial co-operatives), however, structures of similar
characteristics and complexity exist among mutuals in other industries such as insurance (e.g. Promutuel
in Quebec); health management (e.g. Statutory Health Insurance mutuals in Germany); community banks
(Cajas in Spain and Sparkassein Germany, the largest institution, taken as networks, in their respective
countries) to mention just a few. Thus, the interest of understanding these structures transcends vastly the
ﬁeld of FC. Among these latter, most networks are in place well over half a century, with origins tracing
back to the second half of the XIX century, in Germany. With minor institutional variations, they have
been implemented in cultural, legal and economic settings as varied as those of Germany, Australia, Japan,
Quebec, Brazil and Korea to mention a few.
In the empirical portion of the work we compare two systems of FC that choose alternative organization
paths that diﬀer by the complexity and functionality of the hierarchical governance structure they adopt—the
USCU movement as a non-network and the DM as a network. We do this by focusing on X-eﬃciency (EFF)
based on a Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and on the estimation of expense preferences behavior. The
central proposition we test is whether governance structures that result from adopting one or the other
approach of organization, matters in terms of performance measured as EFF. In this sense, this study is
similar to earlier works ([Ingham, 1992], [Armour and Teece, 1978] and [Steer and Cable, 1978]) that test the
hypothesis that the organizational structure of hierarchical ﬁrms —the U-form vs. M-form [Williamson, 1975]—
matters in terms of performance. Two important diﬀerences between those studies and the present are the
following: i) There, the focus is on hierarchical ﬁrms of consolidated joint-stock ownership that adopt
alternative governance structure for the purpose of economizing on transaction costs; we study systems of
independently owned cooperative ﬁrms that choose to enter or not into long-term network relations, also
for the purpose of economizing on transaction costs;3 ii) We use measures of eﬃciency that reﬂect modern
1Throughout the text we will use TCE based standard terminology with only scant or no explanation of its meaning. The
reader is referred to the latest compilation in terms of methodology and advances made using the approach [Williamson, 1996]
for deﬁnitions and examples of uses of the terms. However, to facilitate the reading by individuals acquainted with cooperative
studies likely to be interested in the study but that are unfamiliar with TCE, we explain through footnotes the meaning of
some key concepts on which the theory is built.
2The DM is, in fact, a ”strategic network” with a hierarchical structure of two layers with central nodes playing, among
others, the role of ”hub nodes” with clear responsibility for strategic decision making, and the base units focusing on operational
aspects. In this sense, DM approaches closely an M-form organization [Williamson, 1975] but in which the ”divisions” keep
their legal independence and the central hub-nodes, despite its strategic functions, is an agent of the base units. The analysis
of diﬀerent forms of networks is a subject on itself that will not be covered here. For this reason we will use the expression
”network” when referring to the DM, suppressing the qualiﬁer ”strategic.” The USCU system, on the other hand presents a
few network features. Detailed description of the diﬀerences between the two systems is beyond the scope of the paper and
unnecessary to achieve our purpose of explaining and testing the eﬃciency of alternative organization models for systems of
FC.
3In TCE terminology these are hybrids, organizations that display ”various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading,
1performance analysis of ﬁnancial intermediaries.4 Throughout the paper we will denote both credit unions
and caisses populaires simply as ﬁnancial cooperatives (FC).
2 A TCE based theory of cooperative networks
In this section we will develop the model of networks of FC, providing an explanation of why networks appear
to be a preferred choice of governance—rather than remaining isolated or merge into large organizations—and
appear to present a considerable success. We will do this by ﬁrst, summarizing some key concepts on
contractual law and the way they aﬀect inter-ﬁrm relations. Then, we present a few key stylized facts about
FC on which we build the model. This is followed by an exposition of why appropriability hazard (one of
three critical dimensions of inter-ﬁrm relationships) is the prevailing form of contractual hazard in inter-FC
relations and why expense preferences is a key shift parameter that inﬂuences the way FC may optimally
govern these relations. In the last part of the section we focus on two special issues in networks: the role of
mergers within networks, and the role of the so-called ”subsidiarity principle,” often used in networks of FC
to reinforce high-powered autonomous incentives. We close by collecting the refutable propositions that can
be extracted from the theoretical arguments.
2.1 Networks as a discrete organizational choice of economic organization
One important aspect of network structures, is its discreteness as an organizational form.5 Networks are
one among a limited number of generic forms of organizing economic activity that includes also markets
and hierarchies on both sides of the spectrum.6 Institutional —or governance— choices are discrete rather
than on a continuous line because discrete contract law diﬀerences provide crucial support for and serve to
deﬁne each generic form of governance ( [Williamson, 1991] pp. 270.) and each generic form is supported
and deﬁned by a distinctive contract law. Under market, the applicable contract law is the classical, that
emphasizes discreteness of transaction, presentiation of beneﬁts to the parties and that its enforcement
is assured by the courts.7 This emphasis on discreteness and presentiation of classical contract law is in
full agreement with the nature of the transactions that in economics are understood under markets (as
opposed to hierarchies). Hierarchies, on the other hand, are supported by the contract law of forbearance
(or relational contract law). The third form, hybrids, are not a loose amalgam of markets and hierarchies.
They possess their own disciplined rationale; in networks —and hybrids in general— contracting is supported
by neoclassical contract law.8 Neoclassical contract law provides support for long term relationships with
two key characteristics: i) gaps in the planning of responses expected from the contracting parties9; and ii)
regulation, franchising and the like” ( [Williamson, 1996], pp.104).
4The works cited above use the rate of return on stockholder’s equity as measure of performance. This measure would be
inadequate for FC and out of line with measures of ﬁnancial intermediary performance standard in the literature. This literature
will be reviewed later on.
5Discreteness of organizations has been studied elsewhere ([Simon, 1978], [Williamson, 1985] and [Arregle, Cauvin, Ghertman,
Grand and Rousseau, 2000] (Ch. 2) and citation therein) under the name of ”discrete structural analysis.”
6Markets is a form of economic organization in which individual buyers and sellers bear no dependency relation to each
other. If contracts are renewed period per period , that is only because current suppliers are continuously meeting bids in the
spot market. Hierarchies appear when transactions are internalized into an enterprise (the classical buy versus make options).
The reader will note that we use the expression hierarchy in the very restricted sense deﬁned by transaction costs economics
given above. Networks are also hierarchies when the term is used in a wider sense as multilayered organizations.
7A discrete transaction is one that is entirely separated not only from all other present relations but also from all past
and future relations as well. Presentiation refers to the eﬀort of identifying explicitly the current value for the parties of all
consequences implied by the exchange supported by the contract. A good example of presentiation is the case of an insurance
contract. In a classical contract framework a purchaser of an insurance contract ”is deemed to have consented not only to the
terms in the policy which they did not read and could not have understood if they had, but also to all the interpretations the
law would make of those terms” [Macneil, 1978].
8Neoclassical contract law and excuse doctrine apply to contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain autonomy
but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. As noted by Macneil [Macneil, 1978], ”the long-term economic relations in
question are between ﬁrms rather than within a ﬁrm”. Interpreting the contractual arrangement that exists between ﬁrms in
an e t w o r ka sa ni n t e r ﬁrm rather than an intra-ﬁrm contract is in line with the (often ﬁercely defended) independent character
and local ownership of individual FC in a network.
9The existence of these gaps becomes more important the longer the relationship and the diversity of situations that must
be covered by the contract. In a network of FC, the relationship has, by deﬁnition, an undeﬁned duration and covers a complex
set of business activities. Such contracts are bound to have considerable gaps in the planning of responses required from the
2a range of processes and techniques used by contract planners to create ﬂexibility and avoid leaving gaps or
build in inﬂexibility ([Macneil, 1978], pp. 865). The parties to such contract maintain autonomy, but the
contract is mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism that is supported by governance structures that will
serve to ﬁll the planning gaps and solve potential conﬂicts when need arises. These contracting mechanisms
includes arbitration, take-or-pay procurement, tied sales, agreement to agree, reciprocity, standards and
regulation among others ([Williamson, 1991], pp. 269, [Macneil, 1978], pp. 866-873). Reciprocity and
regulation are two of the contracting mechanism used in networks of FC and that appear to play a key
role in the working of these organizations. These mechanisms will be describe later on. Thus, the principal
diﬀerence between markets and networks is the duration of the contractual relationship and the supporting
contractual law (classical vs. neoclassical respectively) while both forms are similar in that agents conserve
autonomy. Similarly, the principal diﬀerence between hierarchies and hybrids/networks is the autonomy of
the agents (being lost in one and conserved in the other) and the supporting contract law (forbearance and
neoclassical respectively), while the similarity is that governance structures become necessary.10
Institutional forms supported by one or other form of contracting laws do not appear in a continuum.
Neither should it be expected that there is an inﬁnite variation of possible generic institutional forms that
will operate with similar level of eﬃciency, although many local —i.e. relatively minor—institutional variations
are likely to exist. The importance of this notion in our analysis of networks (of FC) is double: i) it serves
to explain that many diﬀerent experiments of institutional innovation at the international level, related or
independent, converge to generic structures, where the relationships between agents are governed by similar
mechanisms; ii) changes in the legal and judiciary context may create highly consequential disturbances that
may impede or facilitate the establishment of a particular generic form or a particular implementation, or
make the implementation of such structures particularly fragile or robust.11 It is known that hybrid economic
relations are used in situation where:
• Mergers may be too risky in view of the uncertainties of the project. In these cases networking allows
to engage in reversible commitments (in this sense networks create valuable real-type options). Ex.
Joint mining or technology development projects.
• Exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the production of inputs while conserving independence
of the contracting parties (protection of residual property rights) is desired. Ex. Printing, banking,
biotechnology.
• Providers of complementary services join in a long-term relationship to provide customers expanded
value through coordination in the provision of the services. Ex. Passenger airline industry (e.g. Star
and Skyteam alliances) and software.12
• Providers and users of a service that implies investment in highly speciﬁc assets (e.g. the classical case
of the contractual relation between a utility producer and the distributor of the service).
In each of these case a TCE rationale can be found at the root of the formation of the network/hybrid
economic relationship. The second application is the one pioneered by FC with a huge success, measured by
the enormous scale and complexity of some of the European networks.
2.2 Stylized facts
To analyze the economic rationale for the creation of networks of FC we must ﬁrst establish a few stylized
facts about FC and the networks they often form:
parties.
10The sociology literature also recognizes the existence of three fundamental types of interfaces between economic agents:
relationship (hierarchy), transactions (markets) and hybrids, with attributes similar to those provided by TCE theorists [Baker,
1990].
11In the case of systems of FC, several examples could be provided (e.g. Argentina, Belgium, Mexico, Uruguay) of legal
disturbances that caused signiﬁcant shifts in the governance of the systems.
12An example of this latter type of arrangement is the E-4 Security alliance formed during 2003. It consist of four leading
ﬁrms in Internet security software: Trend Micro, Nokia, Check Point and Internet Security Systems that cover complementary
software to protect servers from virus, hackers’ and crackers’ attacks.
31. In contrast to the analysis of buy vs. make usually performed in the context of TCE, the contractual
arrangements we are focusing on do not imply a vertical relationship of provision of an input from a
supplier to a buyer. In the case of FC it is a mutual lateral (horizontal) dependency that develops
between the parties (individual FC: ﬁrst-tier nodes). Speciﬁcally, the mutual lateral dependency arises
from a pure production-economics imperative. This, consists of the need to join forces to exploit
economies of scale and to reduce the uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs and the management of
infrastructure required to perform the intermediation process. This feature does not invalidate the
analytical framework provided by TCE, but takes us away from the analysis traditionally performed
using this framework. The same type of motivation appears to be at the root of the other networks
we have made reference to in the previous section. Technological alliances have been object to a
similar analysis [Oxley, 1997]. As in those alliances, the mutual lateral dependency between ﬁrst-
tier nodes arises from cooperative eﬀorts to exploit jointly technologies, marketing, cross licencing,
production and infrastructure management through: equity joint ventures, franchise arrangements and
other multilateral contractual agreements.
2. Pursue of economies of scale is one reason to engage in lateral contractual relations between ﬁrst-tier
nodes, but is not the only. In fact, uncertainty is at least an equal, and perhaps a more important
agglomerating factor. Creating joint mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs
can be a powerful incentive to engage in lateral contracts. In fact, circumstantial evidence suggests
that networks that today have reached an impressive level of development, were often formed to better
manage uncertainty facing individual FC through organs that represented them jointly.13
3. Therefore, while TCE provides the tools to analyze the choice of governance structure (among discrete
forms: market, hybrids and hierarchies), the initial motivation of establishing a relationship between
units is not one of transaction cost economizing, but one that results from production economics
imperatives to exploit economies of scale and reduce uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs. However,
to achieve this goal, individual FC could choose either mergers that would establish a hierarchy-like
organization supported by relational contracts. Or they can choose a hybrid type of relationships
supported by neoclassical contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are
bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. As noted before, these contracts provide support for long
term relationships with two key characteristics: i) the existence of gaps in the planning of responses
by the contracting parties; and ii) the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract
planners to create ﬂexibility ([Macneil, 1978], pp. 865). The units that participate in such contract
maintain autonomy, but the contract is mediated by the elastic contracting mechanism. In this choice,
merger vs. network, the arguments that play the central role are transaction costs economizing ones.
It may perhaps appear to the reader unfamiliar with TCE that the choice in terms of eﬃciency of
the contractual relationship is rather obvious (in favor of mergers).14 This intuition derives from the
fact —addressed below— that a hierarchy-like organization is likely to lead to lower production and
coordination costs. However, we will have the opportunity to present arguments supporting the notion
that this choice is likely not the best. Rather, for transaction economizing arguments networks are
likely to be a better choice.
4. A comprehensive understanding of these types of organizations requires thus a two-step analysis. The
ﬁrst is the purely production economics part of the analysis that deals with the issue of achieving gains
in the cost of acquisition of inputs. The second is the organization economics analysis that focuses
on the type of contractual relationship that will be established between the units (the discriminating
13FC face relatively low output oriented uncertainty with owner/members being also the clients usually belonging to a clearly
deﬁned community. However, they face considerable levels of uncertainty on the inputs they require to provide their members
with desired ﬁnancial services. The very root of networks of FC, the Raiﬀeisen Regional Cooperative Bank (DG Bank), created
in 1865 to manage member liquidity, is one excellent example.
14In fact the policy oriented literature of promotion of FC is choke-full of well intended but ill informed recommendations to
do precisely that: merger to achieve economies of scale. It often does a great disservice to the FC they want to help exposing
them to considerable risks of other nature. As we will see below, mergers is likely not the optimal governance choice at all
when economies of scale in the acquisition on inputs and infrastructure management is the motivation for engaging in lateral
contracting.
4alignment).15 16 The collective contract that establishes the conditions of adherence to the network
by the ﬁrst-tier nodes, to which the collective is tied and that deﬁnes the rights and obligations of the
collective will be called the network subscription agreement (NSA).17 In this work we will ignore the
production economics problem and focus on the governance issue. This latter will be treated using
TCE arguments.
5. While the two problems, the production economics and the governance economics can be treated
separately and using diﬀerent analysis tools, they are not independent of each other. In fact, as
shown elsewhere ([Riordan and Williamson, 1985], pp. 106) they are most likely negatively related.
When individual units choose to establish lateral dependency relationships, they do this with the
goal of reducing production costs (through economies of scale in input acquisition and infrastructure
management). But they will do this at increasing governance cost required to manage the relation.
In traditional TCE analysis, the next step, hybrids, provides middle of the road savings in production
costs and middle of the road increases in governance costs; hierarchy, on the other hand will provide
maximum gains in production costs but maximum governance costs. FC wanting to engage in a NSA
to gain economies of scale will unambiguously face increased governance costs. The challenge we face
is to demonstrate which choice of combination in production and governance costs is the optimal for
FC.
2.3 Contractual hazards in cooperative organizations
In the archetypal problem of vertical integration the focus of transaction cost analysis is on mitigation of hold-
up problems associated with investment in speciﬁc assets.18 However, asset speciﬁcity is only one among
three critical dimensions; the other two usually identiﬁed are frequency of transactions and uncertainty
of transaction. Just as asset speciﬁcity accepts many distinctions —site, physical, human-asset, etc. (see
[Williamson, 1996], pp.105), within the dimension of transaction uncertainty it is possible to accept a number
of sources of uncertainty. While less has been said about the diﬀerent forms this critical dimension may
take, one particular form of contractual hazard that has received increased attention in the literature is
appropriability hazard.T h i sh a z a r da r i s e si ns i t u a t i o n so fi n t e r ﬁrm alliances that involve technology transfers
and common production of goods and services in the presence of weak property rights ([Hagedoorn, 1993],
[Oxley, 1997]). Appropriability hazard (AH) can be traced to diﬃculties in adequately specifying payoﬀ-
relevant activities under conditions of bounded rationality, monitoring the execution of prescribed activities,
and/or enforcing contracts through the courts to control opportunism [Oxley, 1997].
When FC join, either through networks or mergers, to undertake the joint production of a designated
segment of goods, member/owners of the ﬁrst-tier nodes entering into the arrangement give up control of
the distribution of payoﬀs of the joint activity. In doing so they incur in AH.19 However, protection of these
property rights through the court is near impossible given the diﬃculties of third-party veriﬁcation. That is,
15There is yet another transaction economizing problem that arises. It is the one that must be solved to optimize the
relationship between the (joint) acquirers of inputs—the hierarchy or the network—and the supplier of those inputs. This is a
secondary problem that we will also ignore. In practice, in the decision buy vs. make, networks of FC often choose to acquire
many of the suppliers of inputs.
16From a methodological point of view, the ﬁrst step could perhaps be approached using the theory of the club. This
is so because a network c a nb ev i e w e da sa private collective (of enterprises) deriving mutual beneﬁts from procuring and
sharing common (or network) services characterized by excludable beneﬁts, by establishing an organization with a representation
governance that is empowered by the members to procure designated segments of common services. The parallel of this deﬁnition
with that of a club is rather obvious. Club theory can potentially provide the mathematical instruments and theorems necessary
to explain the decision to join the club (the Samuelson condition), the choice of designated segment of common services and
inputs, the optimal size of the network in terms of members, the size of the network facility and other second order economizing
problems. This theory will however not solve the ﬁrst order economizing problem of the choice of economic organization that
must be adopted to govern the relationship between the contracting parties.
17In most networks of FC this NSA does not exist. Rather, the talk is of statutes and by-laws of a federation. since they
play exactly the same role as a NSA, for the purpose of our analysis these are semantic diﬀerences. Interestingly, in the case of
Promutuel of Quebec—a network of insurance cooperatives—a NSA exists explicitly.
18The speciﬁcity of an asset generally makes reference to the ”degree to which that asset can be deployed to an alternative
use without sacriﬁce of productive value” (e.g. [Williamson, 1996], pp. 59).
19We do not exclude the possibility that asset speciﬁc i t ym a ya l s ob ea ni s s u e . H o w e v e ra p p r o p r i a b i l i t yh a z a r dp r o v i d e sa
more straightforward explanation of the type of risk facing parties that engage in a multilateral contract designed for joint
production, acquisition and management of inputs.
5when FC enter into a NSA or into a merger the protection of the property rights to the subscribing parties
falls out of the competence of the courts.20 This protection can only be achieved through mechanisms built
into the network governance institutions. The loss of control over the distribution of payoﬀsi n c r e a s e sw i t h
the intensity of the delegation of decision powers towards the alliance integration structures. In fact, it
reaches its highest point when a full merger of all activities is the choice of governance structure. In this
case, the property rights of individual members are fully diluted into those of the new institution. One
should expect that contracting parties will be reticent to engage in such arrangements unless a reasonable
guarantee exists that the parties’ property rights will indeed be protected. In the context of cooperative
governance structures this is diﬃcult to do. Given the one-member-one-vote principle, all that is needed to
accomplish expropriation of individual property rights of members of a FC entering into a merger, is that
the partner FC has a larger membership.
It has been argued [Oxley, 1997] that AH increases when i) the alliance involves product or process
designs—rather than when only production or marketing activities are undertaken; ii) the range of products
increases; iii) a wider geographical area is covered by the alliance; iv) more ﬁrms are involved. These are
all factors that play a role in networks of FC: they typically engage in product design and production, they
can cover an enormous range of products and huge geographical areas —often the entire country—and involve
hundreds or thousands of institutions. In the context of FC, another factor to consider is that AH will be a
positive function of the size of the institution. Small FC typically provide a narrow range of relatively low
technology ﬁnancial products and services. In consequence, when entering any lateral contract arrangement,
they will be subject to a relatively low level of AH. As the institution grows in size it is likely to oﬀer a wider
range of products with increasingly complex technology incorporated into them. Further, if they merge in
order to gain in economies of scale or engage in limited purpose —CUSOS21— or general purpose networks
with the aim procuring and sharing common (or network) services the technology component of the products
and services oﬀered is also likely to increase.
As proposed elsewhere ([Williamson, 1996], pp. 107) let governance costs be deﬁned as a family of
function GJ = GJ(k,θ) of AH, k, some shift parameters, θ,a n dJ = {M,N,H} where M stands for
market type contractual relationships supported by neoclassical contractual relations, N stands for hybrid
relationships (alliances, networks, etc.) supported by neo-classical contractual relationships, and H stands
for hierarchical (merger) relationships supported by relational contracts. It is also standard to assume
that GM(0) <G N(0) <G H(0) and that G0
M >G 0
N >G 0
H. This, of course, reﬂect the decreasing power
of incentives of increasingly complex organizations setup to govern the relationship. The default low-cost
governance, M,is a simple spot contract supported by classical contract law. Any other governance structure,
such as an alliance or a network, N, or a full merger of partners, H, implies larger governance costs even in the
absence of any contractual hazard (GJ(0)), justifying the ﬁrst set of inequalities. In a graph with horizontal
axe representing contractual hazard, k, and vertical axe governance costs, GJ, the curve corresponding to
M w o u l dc r o s st h ei n t e r c e p ta tt h el o w e s tp o i n tw i t hN and H displaying higher intercepts.22
2.4 The role of expense preferences
Shift parameters usually play little role in TCE analysis. However, one shift parameter that appears to us
to be of particular importance in the analysis of mutual ﬁnancial intermediaries is expense preference (EP)
behavior by managers. It is an established fact that managers are not neutral when it comes to the allocation
of resources into diﬀerent inputs used by the ﬁrm they control.23 Rather, like any individual with bounded
rationality and opportunist behavior, they are likely to engage in subgoal pursuit if given the opportunity.
Among the opportunities of subgoal pursuit, engaging in certain expenses such as personnel and ﬁxed assets
20A continuous appeal to the courts to settle diﬀerences within a network of tens, hundreds or thousands of ﬁrms—as is the
case in these FC networks—would render it hopelessly cumbersome and unresponsive to disturbances. The whole purpose of the
network would thus be defeated.
21CUSOS (Credit Union Service Organizations, common in the United States). We explain these organizations later on.
22Traditionally the graph has been used to represent on the horizontal axe asset speciﬁcity. In our analysis we have not
encountered any contradiction in extending the use of the graph to AH. The analysis is in eﬀect simpliﬁed when using AH. As
in the analysis of asset speciﬁcity, ∆G = GH − GN Q 0 depending upon the level of AH, while changes in production costs
(excluding governance costs) as a result of exploiting economies of joint acquisition (purchase or production) ∆C = CH−CN < 0,
unambiguously. This is not the case of asset speciﬁcity in which case ∆C is a convex function asymptotic to the asset speciﬁcity
axe [Riordan and Williamson, 1985].
23Incidentally, this is an analysis that was also formalized by Williamson ( [Williamson, December 1963]).
6are likely to be favored. Further, this type of subgoal pursuit can be expected to be accentuated with diﬀusion
of ownership [Nicols, 1967] which, in the case of cooperative institutions, is positively correlated with the size
of the institution. Thus, ceteris paribus, larger institutions can be expected to display increasing deviations
from the cost minimizing optimum. This is due to the cooperative principle of one-member one-vote and
the free riding of monitoring phenomenon. These central propositions have been adapted to the context
of mutual ﬁnancial intermediaries and have found unambiguous support in empirical studies ([Gropper and
Beard, 1995], [Akella and Greenbaum, 1988]).24 Three key features of mutuals makes governance less eﬃcient
and thus more prone to be beset by EP problems:
1. The one-member one-vote bars the possibility that single shareholders may take important or domi-
nating positions that will encourage monitoring. Every member is limited, by the very nature of the
cooperative form, to a control of one over the number of members in the mutual;
2. Shares are not traded in secondary markets at ﬂoating prices, all shares are bought from and sold to
the mutual at book value.25 This prevents markets from incorporating into prices investor appreciation
about the quality of management, which in turn would aﬀect the cost of ﬁnancing of the enterprise;26
3. There is no market for corporate control. Control of a mutual cannot be obtained by bidding for shares
in either hostile or friendly takeover.
The absence of these disciplining mechanisms in FC encourages entrenchment and provides conditions
for severe EP behavior. Thus governance in all forms of mutuals —including FC—is considerably weaker than
in joint stock ﬁrms. As a result, in mutuals, EP of managers is always an issue of signiﬁcant consequences
and governance is typically problematic. In fact, one manifestation of EPs is that managers tend to overdi-
mension the organizations they lead beyond the optimum economic size. We will not enter into details
of these propositions and their empirical support since they are well documented, but will use the results
directly in our analysis. The central idea is that the deviation of cost minimizing behavior manifested as EP
increases with the size of the institution. The implication is that size of institution associated to the diﬀerent
governance forms has consequential impact on that choice. In all those governance forms that imply the
existence of large institutions, be they the form M, N or H, higher governance costs can be expected as a
result of managers’s EPs.
In traditional TCE analysis, as contractual hazard in the form of asset speciﬁcity increases, the optimal
organizational choice changes discretely from market to hybrid to hierarchy as each of these governance forms
dominates along a governance costs economizing frontier. We propose that in the case of FC, EP, viewed as a
shift parameter, plays a determinant role in governance costs and choices, increasing signiﬁcantly G0
H.27 As
institutions grow in size due to mergers, EP will accentuate. Thus, FC that face the need, due to production
economic imperatives, to engage in lateral contracts, must decide among three choices: i) remain tied up
in spot contractual relations increasingly unsuitable for the long-term nature of the relationship and for the
level of contractual hazard; ii) lock themselves up into merger operations where AH of member residual
property rights are high, complicated by EP hazard associated with the dilution of ownership; or iii) engage
themselves into alliances with improved protection against AH and where the exercise of EPs is limited.
Accentuated governance costs associated with H due to EP in turn implies that hybrids —networks— will be
the governance mechanism of choice over a wide range of level of appropriability hazard—the ”swollen middle”
[Hennart, 1993]. As a result, systems of FC that seek to increase services to their members through pooling
of resources will either adapt by adopting eﬃcient governance mechanisms thus remaining on the governance
cost economizing frontier, or pay the price of lack of adaptation with ineﬃcient governance mechanisms.
24The eﬀect was also found in the United States Savings and Loans sector ( [Mester, 1991], [Mester, 1989], [Verbrugge and
Goldstein, 1981a], [Verbrugge and Goldstein, Spring, 1981b], [Verbrugge and Jahera, 1981]) and in other industries ([Oswald
and Gardiner, 1994], [Awh and Primeaux, 1985], [Rhoades, 1980]) and in mutual property liabiulity insurance ﬁrms [Cummins,
Weiss and Zi, 1999]. Further, there is an extensive empirical literature of the role of ”agency conﬂicts” —a parallel concept that
describes manager-owner relations from a diﬀerent theoretical perspective [Jensen and Meckling, 1976]—in ﬁrm performance.
Most studies support a negative relation between ownership diﬀusion and performance (e.g. [Lins, 2000], [Su, 2000]).
25Except, of course, in the once in a lifetime cases of those cooperatives that choose to demutualize.
26Residual market discipline remains, with deposits that can be, and often are, priced to reﬂect management quality.
27In fact, it is likely that the northwest shift occurs in both G0
H and G0
N.H o w e v e r , i t s u ﬃces that ∆G0
H > ∆G0
N for the
analysis to hold. As we will see below, this can easily be justiﬁed.
7Given the established understanding about the role of EPs in organization in general, and in mutual
ﬁnancial intermediaries in particular, it is easy to see that they will have an impact on governance costs
in the case of FC that become large by means of mergers (H), accompanied by an increase in contractual
hazard. But why should networks be useful in restraining EPs? The argument is similar to that used to
explain the superiority, under certain conditions, of the M-form organization when compared with the U-form
organization, a proposition that also counts with empirical support. There are two reasons why networks
will tend to curb EP. They are:
1. Networks, by establishing lateral partnerships supported by neoclassical contracts, implies that indi-
vidual institutions remain small, however large the network —in terms of number of members— may
be. Indeed, the Quebec Desjardins network has over 1000 member institutions with a total of over
5.0 million shareholder/clients. In Europe, the German Raiﬀeisen-Volksbank networks is composed of
over 2000 individual FC that service almost 14 million member clients (and another 16 million non-
member clients). The largest individual United States credit union is much larger than the largest
individual Desjardins caisse populaire. Similarly, the largest Ontario credit union is larger than the
largest Desjardins caisse populaire, although the DM taken together is several times the Ontario credit
union movement, in an economy that is considerably smaller.
2. In networks a separation is made between strategic decision making and tactical or operational decision
making. A central node is responsible for proposing or taking strategic decisions —often subject to
approval by the membership through representative governance bodies— with ﬁrst-tier nodes being
responsible for day-to-day operations and performance of the members of the network and the contact
with the shareholder/client. The situation is thus similar to the one that justiﬁes the existence—and
superiority under speciﬁc circumstances— of the M-form organization ([Williamson, 1996], [Ingham,
1992], [Armour and Teece, 1978] and [Steer and Cable, 1978]).28
Managers of ﬁrst-tier nodes are responsible before the second tier nodes —charged with strategic planning
and performance appraisal—for the performance of the node they administer in terms of the satisfaction of
strategic objectives and performance standards. Conversely, managers of second tier nodes are accountable
to the ﬁrst-tier organizations for strategic management of the network. In fact, systems of FC have adopted
the strategy proposed for franchisers (e.g. [Williamson, 1996], pp 64-65 and [Klein and Leﬄer, 1981]) in
which these engage the services of an agent to police performance of member institutions. Given that the
banking licence held by individual FC, and its charter value, depends on the performance of each individual
unit and the network as a whole, the policing agent becomes in eﬀect a supervisor, often adopting the
standards of the state regulatory authority.29 As a result, managers of individual FC are now subject to
two controls: the one emanating from the membership through the governance bodies (Board of Directors
and Supervision/auditing Committees) and the one emanating from the strategic second tier bodies. In
practice, every major system of FC that adopted the network model of organization in the developed and
developing world, engages de services of a policing agent responsible for market practices and prudential
supervision of the ﬁrst-tier nodes. Thus, (self)regulation is one of the key contracting mechanisms that
supports the stability of networks of FC. What varies between networks is the degree of independence
between the strategic nodes and these supervisory bodies. This independence is relatively high in the case
of the German Raiﬀeisen-Volksbank network and almost non-existent in the Brazilian Sicredi or the Korean
NACF (National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, which, despite its name, is a network of mostly FC)
networks. The upshot is, networks of FC —in the way they have been implemented almost universally—
provide explicitly mechanisms to reinforce the governance of individual units and thus curb EP.30 Thus,
28We cannot ignore the possibility that for a network to function adequately, the ﬁrst-tier nodes must achieve a minimum size
below which they may be unsuitable partners for the alliance. One of the reasons why this could be the case is that by being
a member of the network, the range of products oﬀered to its members may increase dramatically. Very small nodes would
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to deliver to its members this vast array of products. This is perhaps the reason that is compelling some of
the networks (Desjardins and the German Raiﬀeisen-Volskbanks systems among others) to encourage mergers of smaller nodes
when practically feasible from the geographical point of view. We will return on this question later on.
29In eﬀect, in networks of FC the action by the policing agent has become auxiliary of state banking regulation, in which
the latter ”delegates” the supervision of individual units to the network policing agent. The speciﬁc institutional setup of this
policing agent varies from system to system, but the function is identical.
30This feature, like several other remarkable regularities present in networks of FC, appear to have been developed more or
less independently in diﬀerent parts of the world. In other words, systems of FC, when they negotiate the mechanisms that will
8Figure 1: Expense preference and network dominance in ﬁnancial cooperatives
other things equal, FC members of networks should display lower exposure to EP. One prediction that can
be drawn from this analysis is that, ceteris paribus networks should display lower variance in the size as well
as in performance indicators of FC operating in a particular market.
Figure 1 illustrates this reasoning. The curves GM, GN,a n dGH correspond to the governance cost
function for markets, networks and hierarchies respectively. In the ﬁgure we have represented two functions
for those corresponding to hierarchies (GHs and GHm)w i t hGHs(0) <G Hm(0) and G0
Hm >G 0
Hs.T h i s
illustrates the fact that those forms of enterprises —say joint stock ﬁrms, s—in which governance is more
eﬃcient than mutuals, m, a less rapid increase in governance costs will be observed as contractual hazard
(and ﬁrm size) increases. The shift may be just parallel and equal to GHm(0) − GHs(0), but it may also
vary according to AH. In fact, the case could be made that this shift may increase with AH as increase in
this will provide managers increased possibilities to exercise EP. The result of this shift results in a range
of contractual hazards (ks to k0
s)f o rj o i n ts t o c kﬁrms over which hybrids is the preferred governance form
that is considerably narrower than that corresponding to mutuals (km to k0
m). No doubt, EP are also an
issue in networks, however for reasons exposed above it is less so than in the other two forms of corporate
governance. How important this shift may be, is of course an empirical question. The shift does not have to
be very large to produce the eﬀect just described. It just needs to be suﬃciently large to span the relevant
range of contractual hazards under which most FC operate. Also, whether GHm and GN cross at all, or
whether the reduction of costs of ex-post haggling between partners more than compensates for the increase
in EP that may result in mergers to insure that G0
N(ki) >G 0
Hm(ki)f o re a c hi, are both open questions worth
investigating. An interesting observation is that strategic networks —i.e. networks where the separation of
strategic and operational decision making is accomplished— are neighbors of the M-form organizations, the
govern the partnership, arrive independently to mechanisms that may diﬀer slightly in their institutional setup, but play the
same role. While there is indeed evidence that some networks have copied certain features from a predecessor, in other cases all
circumstances suggest repeated independent development with the same result. Clearly, the use of regulation is a discriminating
alignment that has demonstrated its usefulness in repeated and independent situations.
9ﬁrst placed just to the left of k0
j — t h ep o i n to fs w i t c ho fd o m i n a n c eo fGNj over GHj to the opposite— and
the second just to the right ([Williamson, 1996], pp. 109)
Based on this analysis, we can predict with very reasonable conﬁdence that over ranges of contractual
hazard that are very small — i.e. FC that are relatively small and unsophisticated in the services they provide
to their members and do not wish to expand those services— one can expect to see institutions that remain
independent or tied up in only very loose arrangement. This is the typical situation of many developing
countries in which FC is an incipient sector oﬀering only very basic ﬁnancial services. This is, anyway, often
all the community they serve needs. The picture on the other end is less clear. However, we adventure to
p o s i tt h a te i t h e r :
• the gains to be made in costs due to reduced ex-post haggling is insuﬃcient to compensate for more
severe EP that result from mergers, thus resulting in G0
N(ki) ≯ G0
Hm(ki) for every i, which may result
in GHm and GN not crossing at all.
• contractual hazard has not been large enough to justify the step of merging networks into consolidated
organizations.
The basis for making this assertion is the following. First, the reasoning, if correct, implies that over rel-
atively large regions of contractual hazard one should observe FC joining into networks. Only as contractual
hazard increase in importance should one observe that outright mergers may become a dominant choice in
terms of governance cost economizing. This is a statement that is valid only for the case of FC. It is easy to
describe situations that apply to other types of institutions in which the hybrid option does not dominate
over any range of contractual hazard. In fact, such a situation will occur if the frequency of disturbances is
large enough ([Williamson, 1996], pp. 116-117). Other scenarios can easily be identiﬁed that would create
the same result. Thus, the more or less obligatory passage through the form N before moving on to H is
—as the dichotomy buy vs. make reveals—by no means universal. In the case of FC it is the important role of
EP that makes this passage more or less obligatory. In the same vein, it might be interesting to investigate
if particular systems of FC might be exposed to situations that would justify skipping N and moving on
directly to ˙ H. Given the relative uniformity of the services provided by FC everywhere—with those organized
around networks invariably providing the widest and more sophisticated range of ﬁnancial services and thus
being exposed to highest contractual hazard—we do not believe that this is the case. We do not know of any
system of FC that has performed this transition as a system: M to N to H. That is, we do not know of any
system of FC that was once organized as a network and has chosen to consolidate operations into a single
organization in which contractual support has moved from neo-classical contract law to a purely relational
contractual environment with consolidation of ownership into a single entity.
Second, often FC merge into larger organizations, sometimes quite large ones. There are two possible
explanations to this phenomenon. i) They are the result of pure EP behavior by aggressive managers that
seek to do exactly what EP suggests, create oversized and suboptimal organizations.31 ii) Under the cover of
an apparent legally consolidated organization they have introduced rule of governance that are designed to
protect members from AH vis a vis the rest of the system and that mimic neoclassical contract law. These
are just networks with a gloss of hierarchy.32 This allows us to provide a refutable hypothesis: in the case of
organizations that resulted from the exercise of EP, they should present governance —and overall—costs, for
equal level of contractual hazard, that are superior than those operating in a network regime. The alternative
hypothesis is that mergers lead to economies of scale and asset diversiﬁcation that makes them more, not
less, eﬃcient. This hypothesis will be tested.
From a practical point of view it is of course unlikely that the choices of governance structure were made
by this reasoning. Rather, diﬀerent systems chose alternative approaches, that lead to structures that today
31We could cite several cases of FC in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, that would be likely to be the
result of this. With a huge social cost, most of these institutions defaulted when their cost structure exceeded their means and
have since exited the market [Desrochers and Fischer, 2002].
32Again, we could cite examples of such organizations in Latin America. Two of the most prominent ones are Caja Popular
Mexicana and Banco Credicoop (Argentina). These institutions evolved into these structures as an adaptation to a regulatory
environment that was hostile to networks of FC and thus were forced into organizational engineering that would conserve the
attributes of networks while presenting an appearance of a consolidated organizations. Interestingly, these organizations could
easily be ”demerged” without changing fundamentally their governance structure and decision making practices. The reverse,
merger, implies dramatic changes in the way decisions are made upsetting completely the balance of power between the ﬁrst-tier
and the central nodes.
10display diﬀering levels of performance or whose historical lack of performance has lead to their extinction
either by reorganization or by exit. In some countries, diﬀerent groups of FC have sometimes taken diﬀerent
institutional approaches resulting in the coexistence of more than one organizational form. Indeed, reality
is more complex than what a parsimonious model of that reality would suggest. The merger vs. network
dichotomy we propose here may become entangled. This is, for example, the case in our two case studies
(United States and Quebec). In the United States, FC have favored growth either by internal means or
through mergers. In Quebec, over the last 50 years, FC (now uniﬁed under the Desjardins banner) have
become highly integrated into a network. However, in the United States FC increasingly join in limited
purpose networks —in contrast to all purpose networks such as Desjardins and others— known as CUSOs
(Credit Union Service Organizations).33 On the other hand, Desjardins —and other networks of FC—have,
in the last few years engaged in a considerable consolidation of its structure encouraging merger activity,
specially among the smallest members of the network.34 We will address explicitly this issue below. Yet, care
has been taken to discourage formation of very large FC, to seek a balance in the size of member units and
to encourage a deepening of the division of labor between member FC and the network second-tier nodes.
That is, the merger activity was designed to strengthen the ties and increase eﬃciency within the networks.
These processes result is two clearly distinguishable models of cooperative organization and governance. The
United States credit union system, with a loose level of integration with some very large institutions that
result from mergers and internal growth on one hand. On the other, the Quebec Desjardins movement built
a strategic network where central nodes provide a wide range of inputs, infrastructure management services,
strategic leadership and monitoring functions.
2.5 Mergers in networks
While in network based system hybrid contractual arrangements dominate, as we noted earlier, mergers
among network members are not uncommon. This suggests that, given certain circumstances, in multilateral
hybrid systems merging and networking may not always be mutually exclusive contractual arrangements.
That is, subset of units, while controlling much of contractual hazard resulting of lateral relations through
network arrangements, may still beneﬁt from mergers among them. This is a somewhat unusual setting in
the context of TCE where hybrids and mergers are seen as mutually exclusive mechanisms.
We will exclude those kind of mergers that may be exclusively the result of managers subgoal pursuit,
and to which we made reference earlier. Making use of TCE analytical tools, it is possible to conceive
situations where, despite the existence of a network governance structure, local mergers may be desirable. A
solution to the puzzle has been provided by Williamson (e.g. [Williamson, 1996]) by explaining the role of
another critical dimension in contractual relations, frequency of transactions. To see the role of frequency of
transactions in the context presented thus far, imagine the following scenario. A multilateral networks as the
one described in previous section exists. This network was created to govern the joint venture relationships
designed solve the pure production-economics type of imperative to exploit economies of scale and to reduce
the uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs and the management of infrastructure required to complete the
intermediation process. However, for a subsets of network members local imperatives develop. The situation
can most easily be seen in, say two, neighboring FC. There:
1. The membership/clientele engages in multiple and frequent crossed transactions that involve resources
of both institutions. Examples of these transactions may be the use of each others ATM resulting in
continuous settling of balances between the parties. Under these conditions, merging the institution
to internalize transactions presents operational cost advantages that more than compensate increased
governance costs —due to EP—that may result from a merger, and that are generally controlled by the
regulatory bodies of the network.
2. These two institutions, due to territorial commonality of their membership, may beneﬁt from pooling
infrastructure which cannot be furnished advantageously by the network (e.g. buildings, ATM).
33These are joint ventures of a limited number of FC in which some speciﬁc resources are pooled and jointly used by the
members of the CUSO. They are hybrid/network organizations in the sense given to the word in TCE. Examples of resources
pooled under CUSO are ATMs and Common service branches. However, U.S. FC have not reached the level of network
integration that characterizes Desjardins, where every FC in the system participates in a vast club of common resources and
pooling of risk coupled with a sophisticated governance structure. In fact, most U.S. based FC have not joined any CUSO.
34Leaders of the Desjardins movement have set the target of reducing the number of FC from over 1200 to below 800.
113. Finally, and most importantly, owner-members of both institutions may perceive that the protection
of their residual rights may not be in peril in a merger since the commonality of interests is suﬃcient
to prevent expropriation by either partners. Further, the network structure provide adequate compen-
satory control over management subgoal pursuit despite dilution of direct control by the membership.
Under these conditions, despite the existence of a network arrangement, certain local merger activity
may be justiﬁed, although the overall network structure dominates at the macro level.35 This suggests that
the analysis of networks of FC is in reality a multi-layered exercise in which a particular dimension (e.g.
appropriability hazard) plays a dominant role and another dimension (e.g. frequency of transactions) plays
a role under the shadow of the ﬁrst. The outcome of one or the other action depends upon which dimension
dominates. For example, a merger that may be the optimal cost economizing alignments when performed
within a network—with the beneﬁts in terms of economizing on bounded rationality— may not be so in absence
of one.
2.6 Subsidiarity
A concept often used by networks of FC to regulate governance mechanisms—and that to our knowledge
has no parallel in the TCE literature nor in writings about hybrids— is the subsidiarity principle.T h e
interest of analyzing this concept is that its function is to increase the power of autonomous incentives
within organizations. The importance of autonomous incentives in encouraging adjustment to consequential
disturbances is amply discussed in the TCE literature and needs not be repeated here. In addition to
reinforce higher-powered incentives the subsidiarity principle also has the eﬀect of decentralizing the search
of policy solutions and decision making whenever relevant. Recent models [Kollman, Miller and Page, 2000]
reveal the advantage of this decentralization in federated organizations since they exploit and combine the
mutual information discovered by the subunits to reveal even better solutions.
A dictionary based deﬁnition of the term subsidiarity, articulated for political structures, suggests that it
is a concept that opposes centralization, that delimits the function of second tier nodes to that of supporting
and complementing auto-determination of ﬁrst-tier units.36 In the Collins Concise Dictionary, the word
subsidiarity is deﬁned as the principle of devolving political decisions to the lowest practical level. The
application of the principle of subsidiarity encourages decentralization of functions in the network yielding as
a result that the maximum amount possible of task are organized around ﬁrst-tier nodes. According to some
observers of cooperative movements [Heinke, 1993] the only fact that justiﬁes a second tier node to assumes
a particular political or business function is that the ﬁrst-tier node(s) is (are) incapable of performing locally
the functions necessary for the delivery of services to their members.37
The central ideas behind the principle of subsidiarity are thus the following:
• The second (and higher) tier nodes have the function of assisting or functioning in a supplementary
capacity only, and this only by ﬁrst-tier nodes’ choice.
• Under no circumstances are higher tier organizations to carry out activities that may compete with
the lower tier nodes.38
35Mergers may also occur in networks due to corrective actions. In the case that a particular FC may underperform or
become non-viable as individual unit, merger may the most logical solution. However, in this case merger cannot be viewed as
a strategy of radial growth although the acquiring institution will in fact become larger.
36The word ”subsidiarity” derives from ”subsiduum” or ”subsidium” that in military science refers to reserve troops, that
engage only in those occasions in which combating troops are insuﬃcient. The principle of subsidiarity ﬁnds ideological roots
in the catholic social philosophy, with an explicit formulation in the 1931 Social Encyclica Quadragesimo Anno.
37This principle is a key feature also for political structures in which long-term alliances are formed that imply complex
governance and institutional structures while the ﬁrst tier units (in this case provinces and states) wish to conserve the level
of autonomy that the protection of the interests of their constituency requires while promoting overall eﬃciency of the system.
For example, the subsidiarity principle plays a central role in the European Maastricht Accord. This Accord also extends the
concept of subsidiarity. There, it is speciﬁed that the second tier nodes (EEC bodies) should engage in functions that are not
of their competence only in those cases in which the overall goals of the system cannot be achieved otherwise. This extension
appears reasonable for networks such as those created by FC, to the extent that recalcitrant individual ﬁrst-tier nodes could
otherwise hold the entire network hostage of achieving desirable goals. However, this extension of the concept also opens the
door to arbitrary centralization of power by second-tier nodes.
38A simple but illustrating example of application of this principle is the case of the Reinsurance company owned by Promutuel
of Quebec. This, while specialized in reinsurance of casualty insurance liabilities, is allowed to retail casualty insurance directly
12• The maximum amount possible of task are organized around the ﬁrst-tier nodes.
• Second tier organs provide only services that cannot be provided by the ﬁrst-tier nodes and that require
economies of scale or can be produced only by the higher tier nodes.
Some particularly important examples of application of the principle of subsidiarity are the following:
the abstention of second tier nodes to accept membership of—or to accept deposits from or provide credit
to— natural persons; the abstention of second tier nodes to open branches or points of services that compete
with the activities of the ﬁrst-tier units; the abstention of second tier nodes to execute business transactions
with members that are within the sphere of activities of the ﬁrst-tier units.
The use of principle of subsidiarity is perhaps one of the least evident features of networks of FC. While
ad e ﬁnition of the principle and notes about the necessity of its use are relatively easy to ﬁnd, particularly
in the German literature on networks of FC and Sparkassen,39 much less is said about its speciﬁc economic
role. However its consistent application can easily been explained in terms of TCE. We may attribute to the
principle of subsidiarity precise economic functions:
1. Increases the overall eﬃciency of the network. As in the M-form, the subsidiarity principle promotes
t h es e p a r a t i o no fc o m p e t e n c eo fﬁrst and second tier nodes with each one assuming only the function
in which they are most eﬃcient or present comparative advantages.
2. Reduces the impact of errors on the network. By keeping decision and activities at the lower levels when
economies of scale or comparative advantage do not justify unambiguously their transfer to second tier
nodes, errors committed in the exercise of the business activity will tend to have a local impact only,
keeping the rest of the network shielded and facilitating learning.
3. Introduces an environment of competition in the network. Preventing unnecessary centralization and
favoring initiatives at the local level. An environment of experimentation and competition is thus
created that facilitates the rapid transmission of tried and eﬃcient solutions across the network.
4. Limits the uncontrolled growth of second tier nodes and insures governability of the network. The
principle of subsidiarity establishes a relatively clear criteria for the separation of functions between
ﬁrst and second tier nodes and reaﬃrms the accessory role of the second with respect to the ﬁrst. In this
context it is interesting to note the deﬁnition of subsidiarity provided by S. Battisti and cited by Reibert
[Reibert, 1994]40 According to Battisti, subsidiarity is a rule of competence attribution and construction
for associations and federations that serves as guide for questions of design. Subsidiarity thus provides
a criteria that delimits the growth of second tier organizations encouraging their expansion when
important economies can be achieved by transferring functions from ﬁrst to second tier nodes or
putting a break on their expansion when the subsidiarity principle is being transgressed.41
Clearly, the principle of subsidiarity used and invoked so often by networks of FC has clearly the role
to strengthen autonomous adaptation mechanisms within the network. As often emphasized, autonomous
adaptations by economic units constitute one of the market’s most powerful attributes to force economic
eﬃciency. Thus, networks FC clearly seek explicitly to exploit in a balanced fashion both Hayek’s autonomous
adaptation and Barnard’s cooperative adaptation mechanisms [Williamson, 1996].
2.7 Summary of refutable propositions
With the purpose of providing an overview of the refutable propositions that can be drawn from the frame-
work presented above, we now present a brief summary of hypotheses that might be tested to verify or reject
the propositions. Of these hypotheses, some require data to which we do not have access. For this reason we
to the public only in those territories where members of the Promutuel federation have no installed selling capacity, particularly
the ”open territories” of Montreal and Quebec City.
39e.g. [Arzbach, 2000], [Bonus, Greve, Kring and Polster, 1999], [Reibert, 1994] and [Heinke, 1993].
40The citation is from the book by Battisti, The Historical Intellectual Roots of the Subsidiarity Principle.
41Some authors [Heinke, 1993] also deﬁne what they call the ”active subsidiarity.” Under this concept reference is made to
activities second tier nodes engage to cover ”seamlessly” all aspects of the market in which competition is occurring and in
which ﬁrst-tier units are not active or have not the competence to become active.
13will focus on those that can be tested with the data available. We will also present the approach that will
be used for testing these predictions. The summary of predictions articulated in previous pages is, ceteris
paribus:
1. H1: Over ranges of low AH non integration is optimal. Over ranges of contractual hazard
that are very small one can expect to see institutions that remain independent or tied up in only very
loose arrangement while conserving a relatively high level of eﬃciency. This is the typical situation of
many developing countries in which FC is an incipient sector oﬀe r i n go n l yv e r yb a s i cﬁnancial services,
which is often all the community they serve needs.
2. H2: As AH increases network organizations dominate: For higher levels of contractual hazard,
networks become the optimal form of organization. Thus, for similar level of contractual hazard FC
operating in networks should display higher levels of X-eﬃciency and lower variance is the size of
institutions than FC not members of networks. This is so because FC members of networks:
(a) Solve the economies of scale imperative through joint productions;
(b) Adopt a cost eﬃcient governance structure;
(c) Avoid the use of sub-optimal merger based growth strategies.
3. H3: EP increases with the size of the institution but less so in networks. Since risk of EP
is positively related to size of the institution (due to limits on governance and lack of separation of
functions), over a range of large FC, diﬀerences in X-eﬃciency and EP between members and non-
members of networks will be relatively large.
4. H4: Mergers may increase EP: Under both growth strategies (merger or network based) FC
created by mergers that resulted from the exercise of EP should present lower X-eﬃciency and higher
EP.
In formulating H3 we have not excluded the possibility of employing either radial growth or network
arrangement (such as CUSOS) in either system as secondary mechanism. What matters is the primary
mechanism of growth.
We note two aspects of the testing procedures we will use:
• Much of the empirical tests will be based on measures of eﬃciency (X-eﬃciency) and EP standard
in analysis of performance of ﬁnancial intermediaries. X-eﬃciency is a measure of performance par-
ticularly suited to the analysis at hand. In TCE the analysis centers on cost economizing governance
mechanisms, however, what matters (as noted by [Riordan and Williamson, 1985]) is the cumulative
cost of production and governance costs. The optimal choice is that which minimizes the total cost
of production and governance. X-eﬃciency measures exactly this costs. Similarly, well established
statistical measures of EP—often used to compare joint-stock and mutual type of intermediaries—will
allow us to test some of the central propositions of the theory.
• We face the diﬃcult task of ﬁnding a suitable proxy of contractual hazard. This is a common problem to
empirical research that uses TCE as the framework of analysis. However, throughout the presentation
we have argued that contractual hazard and size of institution are positively —albeit imperfectly—
correlated. For this reason we will use size as a proxy of contractual hazard.
3 The statistical model
We propose to verify whether belonging to a network —an alternative mechanism of transaction governance-
changes the portrait of X-eﬃciency of individual FC as they grow in size. This measure of performance is
based on a single standard translog cost function. We propose also to verify whether EP diﬀer in networks
and non-network systems. Since our goal is to test the hypothesis that governance matters, rather than to
innovate in the technique of eﬃciency measure, we use a well established approach to measure eﬃciency and
EP.
143.1 X-eﬃciency
Speciﬁcally, we use the intermediation approach, considering the amount of loans as outputs, as in [Mitchell
and Onvural, 1996], except for a few modiﬁcations that we present below and justify as we go. The value
of deposits, capital and the number of employees are the inputs. In addition to operational costs, the
approach also includes interest costs on the right hand side. The model is based on the work of [Sealey
and Lindley, 1977]. Since homogeneity of input prices (Aij =0 )w a sn o tv e r i ﬁed, we include cross-terms.
More speciﬁcally, our model is inspired from the adaptation for ﬁnancial intermediaries of the work of Sealey
[Mitchell and Onvural, 1996]. The modiﬁcations are:
• Instead of using cross-sectional estimations, we adopt a distribution-free approach (DFA), a methodol-
ogy used in previous studies ( [Berger, 1993], [Berger and Mester, 1997], [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux
and Moore, 2001]).
• We include various dummy variables to form adequate categories, an approach sometimes favored
[Westley and Shaﬀer, 1999]. Following established practice ([Fried, Lovell and Eeckaut, 1993], [Hugues
and Mester, 1993], [Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani, Spring 1996] and [Berger and Mester, 1997])
we discriminate among ﬁve size categories.
• Since we use panel data, we decide upon the estimation procedure (ﬁxed eﬀect or random eﬀect
estimators) by performing a Hausman test [Hausman, 1978]. This test is essential when using panel to
verify whether parameters should be drawn from a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator (unbiased but ineﬃcient) or
a random eﬀect estimator (eﬃcient buy potentially biased if E[X | ².] 6= 0, that is, if the X matrix of
covariates is not independent of individual factors ²). 42
• We include a technical eﬃciency catch-all factor estimated by a trend variable and its cross-terms with
inputs prices and quantities. The approach has become standard in the literature ([Gallant, 1981], [Lang
and Welzel, 1996b], [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] and [Kumbhakar, Lozano-Vivas,
Lovell and Hassan, 2001]).
• We do not include cost share equations, to reﬂect the fact that FC are not assumed to minimize their
costs as a joint stock bank would. This is consistent with the study of German cooperative banks
[Lang and Welzel, 1996b].43
• The model is deﬁned as follows:
LnC = α0 + b0x +
1
2
x0Ax + FF + ² + ε (1)
Where:
LnC= natural logarithm of costs;
α0 =ac o n s t a n t ;
b = a vector of coeﬃcients;
x = a matrix of variables including 3 non-scaled log-input prices, 1 non-scaled log-output quantity, 1
trend variable to reﬂect technological changes, log of credit risk, log of capitalization, and a dummy for
acquiring institutions. As noted, we also include nine dummy variables to separate into ﬁve size groups for
each country, with the smallest Quebec FC representing the intercept. Table III presents the deﬁnition and
basic characteristics of the variables. Note that CRR, CAP, and ACQ variables are not included in cross
analyses. Fourier Flexible terms require scaled variables comprised within [0,2π] range. Table IV presents
42If independence is veriﬁed, the appropriate estimation procedure is one of random eﬀect, and if it is not, the use of ﬁxed
eﬀect estimation procedures becomes imperative to avoid bias in the key coeﬃcients. This procedure was apparently not followed
by some earlier research that made use of the random eﬀect procedure ([Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001]).
Others [Lang and Welzel, 1996a] present results for both ﬁxed and random eﬀect estimators but do not indicate which is the
unbiased vector. As shown by [Hausman, 1978], only one set of estimators is adequate for a speciﬁc sample, with one of them
either ineﬃcient, or biased.
43We note however that various authors imposed cost minimization for non-proﬁt ﬁnancial intermediaries ([Murray J.D., 1983],
[Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani, Spring 1996] and [Westley and Shaﬀer, 1999]).
15the basic characteristics of our scaled variables and scaling factors. The scaling process is consistent with
earlier work [Mitchell and Onvural, 1996].
A =[ Aw1,A w2,A w3,A x1,A x2,A x3,A y,A T,GR1,...,GR9], a matrix of 90 coeﬃcients most of which are
related to cross terms;
FF= a series of Fourier transform terms to be deﬁned later;
² = individual eﬃciency component of error;
ε = random error;
The usual constraints to insure homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of second-order coeﬃcients
are imposed:
P4
i=1 bwi = 1,
P
Aij= 0. Besides these restrictions we also assure that trigonometric terms
including input prices respect the condition
P
kh =0( [ G a l l a n t ,1982], [Mitchell and Onvural, 1996]).
As detailed in Table III, the dependent variable is total costs, including both operational expenses and
interest expenses. The independent variables include three inputs and their respective prices : interest rate
on deposits, cost of personnel, and cost of ﬁxed capital. We include only one output, the quantity of loans.
All these variables are unscaled. We also integrate an ex post risk measure: the proportion of bad loans over
net loans and the amount of capital over assets. This variable control for heteroskedasticity and potential
diﬀerences between well and poorly capitalized FC. In eﬀect, strong evidence ([Hugues and Mester, 1993],
[Mester, 1993], [Hugues, Lang, Mester and Moon, 1996], and [Berger and Mester, 1997]) support inclusion
of capital into cost eﬃciency. A small cooperative does not have access to the same amount of deposits due
to a lesser capital. Larger FC have more possibilities to generate proﬁts because they already accumulated
some reserves over time that give them more ﬂexibility in their asset-management. A study with a data
set consisting of 441 bank holding companies demonstrated that inclusion of capital structure and risk-
taking into eﬃciency measurement improves the estimated coeﬃcients [Hugues, Mester and Moon, 2000],
two variables also included elsewhere [Hugues and Mester, 1993].
We use an unbalanced panel data set over the years 1996-2000 (described below) including merging
institutions in Quebec. We consider both pre-merger institutions as independent FC, and post-merger
institution as a diﬀerent institution. We use a diﬀerent U.S. paired-FC after merger, and include a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 when the merger occurs. This approach follows established practice ([Lang and
Welzel, 1996b],[Lang and Welzel, 1999]). Then we include a set of dummy variables to distinguish among
various groups of FC. We divided the sample into ﬁve size groups in terms of asset values: less than 5.0
millions; 5-10 millions; 10-25 millions; 25-50 millions and, last group, more than 50 millions. Thus, the
intercept represents U.S. FC with assets <5.0 millions, the ﬁrst dummy includes U.S. FC with real assets
between 5 and 10 millions, the second one between 10 and 25 millions, the third between 25 and 50 millions,
while the fourth includes the ones above 50 millions. The ﬁfth to ninth dummies includes Canadian FC
whose assets are distributed among similar size groups. More precisely, the ﬁfth includes Canadian FC
whose assets are below 5 millions, while the ninth group includes Canadian FC whose assets are above 50
millions. The groups were recomposed each year to control for migration due to natural growth or merger.
Through the use of size and country dummies we have estimated unrestricted models that are speciﬁct o
each country and group size.
The last section of our model (presented by expression FF) is related to Fourier transform terms. They
are trigonometric modiﬁcations of scaled variables included in the function (3 inputs, 3 input prices, and 1
output). This process enables the cost function to better ﬁt data than the Translog cost function eliminating
some of the assumptions of parametric models, as we will discuss in the following section. Next sections
present some aspects of performance measurement, the FF terms and error decomposition, respectively.
The error term is divided into an ineﬃciency (²) and a random (ε) component. The ﬁrst component is
the core (or individual mean) ineﬃciency, estimated as the time average of each FC’s residual, while the
second component is the purely random component.
3.1.1 Measures of Performance








i is the minimal cost associated to the most eﬃcient CU, approximated by the 1% fractile of
16our sample in order to avoid extreme observations. The interpretation of the ratio is that it represents the
proportion of costs that is eﬃciently used. For example, if ²Min
i is representing 70% of ²i, 70% of costs of
this FC is used eﬃciently, and 30% is wasted ineﬃciently. All FC having a cost below the 1% fractile receive
a 100% eﬃciency score.
3.1.2 Fourier Flexible Functional Form
In order to be coherent with some recent critics of the translog cost function for eﬃciency measurement
([Mitchell and Onvural, 1996], [Berger and Mester, 1997]), we decide to estimate a model that integrates
trigonometric independent variables. The translog speciﬁcation imposes a U-shaped cost function that might
not be the adequate form of the cost structure. Fourier Flexible (FF) functional form permits to estimate
the bias introduced by traditional translog cost function [Mitchell and Onvural, 1996]. In eﬀect, assuming
that the true cost function of the credit unions follows a translog function might introduce a bias if this is
not actually the case. The superiority of the FF functional form has been demonstrated ([Gallant, 1981],
[Gallant, 1982], [Mitchell and Onvural, 1996], [Berger, Leusner and Mingo, 1997]) by performing exclusion
tests on the FF terms. Eﬃciency ranking is not much aﬀected by the inclusion of FF terms, though
each coeﬃcient taken separately was signiﬁcant [Berger and DeYoung, 1997]. Some authors found that
ineﬃciencies were twice as big when excluding the FF terms [Berger and DeYoung, 1997]. The choice of
trigonometric terms was inspired from earlier studies ([Mitchell and Onvural, 1996] and [Altunbas, Gardener,
Molyneux and Moore, 2001]). Like previous works ([Mitchell and Onvural, 1996], [Berger and Mester, 1997])
we test the impact of adding FF terms by estimating the signiﬁcance of their associated coeﬃcients. We also
perform additional exclusion tests as done in previous studies mentioned above. The set of trigonometric
terms selected and exclusion tests are presented in Table IV.
3.2 Expense preference
To test presence of EP we use the approach most favored in the empirical literature [Mester, 1989] (Mester).44
Mester (and other that followed her methodology) compare two groups of enterprises, one of joint-stock and
the other of mutual intermediaries, under the assumption that the production technology of both groups is
not the same-case in which the simple test of intercept becomes invalid. In particular, we use the separable
expense parameter zi and the joint expense parameter ρi tests that correspond to separable and joint decision
models respectively.45 The major diﬀerence between X-eﬃciency and EP tests is that the latter concentrates
on the quantity of speciﬁc inputs used, while the prior also considers the eﬀect of input prices and output
quantities. That is, the EP tests focus on the decision of managers to suboptimally use some speciﬁc inputs,
excluding the other eﬀects. Our interest is to know whether larger FC present higher EP than smaller ones
(see H3 above). Since our sample is constituted of mutuals only, we cannot adopt the usual deﬁnition of
the two groups (mutuals being considered as expensers, and joint stock institutions as proﬁt maximizers).
Instead assume that larger FC favor a suboptimal utilization of inputs (the expensers), while smaller FC
make a judicious use of their inputs (the cost minimizers).Thus, for each system we divide the sample into
two groups by size of membership. The separating criteria is the median. From there on the test applied
is that proposed by Mester in equations 10a n d11 ([Mester, 1989]. pp. 489). Thus the test consists of
computing zi and ρi for the groups of larger FC in each system and then compare the value these parameters
take in each system. EP will be larger in the systems that presents the larger zi and ρi. We focus on two
types of expenses: labor and ﬁxed assets. The assumption is that expenders will use more of these two
inputs than the cost minimizing FC.
44Other approaches exist (e.g. [Cummins, Weiss and Zi, 1999], [Mester, 1993]) but Mester is the most cited. It is also the
approach subject to least restrictions on the properties of the underlying log cost function.
45Separable EP is deﬁned as the utilization of excessive inputs, once costs have been minimized. It is thus the result of a
two steps process: ﬁrst, the manager of the FC tries to maximize proﬁts (e.g. minimize costs), and second decides to use a
greater quantity of some inputs. Price eﬀect of input prices thus do not intervene in the process. Joint EP is the result of a
one-step process that cannot be disentangled between proﬁt maximization and overutilization of some inputs. More precisely,
the managers do not try at ﬁrst to minimize costs, but rather consume more of speciﬁc inputs (e.g. labor) than a proﬁt
maximizers.
173.3 Panel Data Set and Error Decomposition
A critical assumption associated to stochastic frontier approaches (SFA) models is that the error term can
be decomposed into a random component, following a normal distribution, and an eﬃciency component,
following a half-normal distribution. Many alternatives were proposed to avoid this critical assumption,
as the hypothesis of half-normal distribution of the eﬃciency component received some critics recently
([Greene, 1990] and [Berger, 1993]). We concentrate on three alternatives: The ﬁrst consists in eliminating
the random component of the error term altogether, using a non-parametric model such as DEA or FDH.
As we previously mentioned, DEA avoids the decomposition of errors between eﬃciency and randomness by
assuming that the random component is simply not present and that diﬀerences in total costs are completely
explained by diﬀerences in eﬃciency ([Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka and Rangan, 1990], [Ferrier and Lovell, 1990],
[Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990]). The second alternative is to set an arbitrary limit between random error
and eﬃciency, with a methodology such as the TFA [Lozano Vivas, 1997]. This methodology assumes that
deviations from predicted costs within the lowest average-cost quartile are attributable to random error, while
deviations in the remaining quartiles are attributable to eﬃciency. TFA only substitutes the assumption
about the distribution of the error term with an equally arbitrary assumption about where the ineﬃciencies
stop and the random errors begin [Berger, 1993]. Important divergences in the results were noted from one
methodology to another. This inconsistency prompted some critics to both approaches:
Berger and Humphrey attribute the inconsistent ranking to the major sins of these two ap-
proaches - viz., too little account of random error by the non-parametric studies and too much
structure imposed on the frontier by the parametric approaches.[Berger and Mester, 1997]
The third alternative is to consider a random error component, but to eliminate all the distributional
constraints by introducing a panel data set. Several authors have noted the virtues of DFA estimates
obtained with a panel data set ([Schmidt and Sickles, 1984], [Berger, 1993], [Berger and Mester, 1997],
[Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001]). A methodology was established to evaluate the most
adequate number of years to consider, with data covering 618 U.S. commercial banks over eleven (11)y e a r s
[DeYoung, 1997]. De Young found that a six (6) years period is the best compromise between too little (which
introduces a large dispersion or residuals) and too much time periods (which is delicate if some tendency is
included in the data).
Concretely, our method consists in estimating average individual ineﬃciency over the ﬁve year period.
This constitutes the non-random component (²) of error, or average ineﬃciency. This measure is compared
to the level of ineﬃciency of most eﬃcient FC over the ﬁve-years period, which eliminates short term
randomness. As suggested in Hausman [Hausman, 1978], we test whether a random or a ﬁxed eﬀect model is
more appropriate with a Chi-square test comparing the vector of coeﬃcient estimated with both models.46
4D a t a
We consider an unbalanced panel data set of 1 281 FC from Quebec and U.S. respectively, yielding a total
of 11732 observations between 1996 and 2000. The characteristics of our samples are presented in Table I.
As we have access to a larger U.S. sample, we associated one U.S. FC for each Quebec FC whose assets were
most similar in value as of December 1996. In order to have a better size matching, we do not diﬀerentiate
between U.S. FC types. In December 1996, we considered 778 (1188 in December 2000) federally chartered,
federally insured FC, 483 (93 in December 2000) state chartered, federally insured FC, and 28 state chartered,
non-insured FC (0 in December 2000).
We keep our initial matching until the U.S. FC disappears from the data base, in which case it is
replaced by another U.S. FC whose value of assets is nearest to the value of the Canadian CU, at the date
46More precisely, we estimate the m statistic, presented in Equation 5.1. of page 1268 [Hausman, 1978]. This statistic
estimates the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence of parameters from random and ﬁxed eﬀect models. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence means
the null hypothesis of no ﬁxed eﬀect (Equation 3.4, page 1261) is rejected, so a random eﬀect model would be biased. If the
m statistic is not signiﬁcant, then the alternative hypothesis (Equation 3.1, page 1261) is rejected, a ﬁxed eﬀect model is then
ineﬃcient but unbiased. We observe a very signiﬁcant m statistic, so we reject the null hypothesis and conclude a random
eﬀect model would be biased. Again, we have strong doubts on the validity of results of previous studies that did not use the
adequate set of coeﬃcient.
18of change. In other words, when a Canadian FC disappears we eliminate both the Canadian and its paired
U.S. observations, but in case a U.S. FC disappears, we substitute with a new matching FC. Our pairs, once
formed, remain constant. This means that the average size of the FC might increase diﬀerently in both
countries. As expected, a test of diﬀerence of means (Z-test) demonstrated that the size of Quebec FC and
their U.S. counterparts are not statistically diﬀerent. More interestingly, a similar test showed that the size
of U.S.-paired cooperatives is also comparable to the average size of the complete U.S. data base, containing
more than 10 000 CU. Thus, we can state with reasonable conﬁdence that results reported for our sample are
likely to apply to the complete U.S. sample.
Our sample includes a rather heterogeneous set of FC. We assured for poolability of data ﬁrst by control-
ling for time trend. Our second control for poolability consists in estimating Equation 1 excluding and then
including GR1,...,GR9 dummy variables and test for the importance of individual and time eﬀect in error
decomposition, a common approach with panel data. The inclusion of these dummy variables signiﬁcantly
reduced the F-statistics of both eﬀects. We also veriﬁed if our sample is poolable among size groups and
countries. To test for poolability, we use Chow tests that compare the sum of squared errors of our con-
strained model (deﬁned in Equation 1) and alternative unconstrained models (estimating ﬁrst ﬁve distinct
models for each size category, and then two distinct models for each country). In order to better disaggregate
the analysis we then run group-speciﬁc regressions and test for comparability of restricted and unrestricted
models. F-statistic of Chow test suggest keeping size dummy variables in the restricted model.47 We also
perform separate estimations for each size group. We ﬁnd diﬀering coeﬃcients but similar performance
ratios, thus we continue reporting results obtained from the joint model.
5R e s u l t s
First some general observations on summary statistics. Table I shows that Quebec caisses populaires and
size-paired U.S. credit unions have similar clienteles, i.e. have comparable median size of loans and deposits.
Despite their almost identical size and similar clientele, Quebec FC manage a substantially greater amount
of loans in proportion to administrative expenses. In eﬀect, Quebec FC present a median ratio of loans over
administrative costs between 34 and 46, while their U.S. counterparts present a median ratio between 24
and 27. Large U.S. FC do not perform appreciably better than their smaller counterparts: the ratio for
largest FC is only 5% higher than for the smallest FC in the U.S., while the improvement in Quebec is 35%.
This suggests that EP that become more important with size is controlled by the regulatory mechanisms in
the network. This is consistent with the theory exposed in the ﬁrst part of the paper. The ratio of deposits
over loans, when it is greater than 100% is a measure of funds acquired from members that are not used
for member-oriented ﬁnancial intermediation. The ratio is substantially higher in U.S. than Quebec FC,
which means that U.S. FC accept funds that are used in activities (e.g. purchase of ﬁxed assets) other
than to provide credit services to its members. Though we recognize that in the banking literature this
ratio is a measure of credit risk exposure, in the context of FC it reﬂects often the use of member funds for
unproductive purposes such as ﬁxed asset (conﬁrmed by the Fixed-to-Total Assets ratio).
The intermediation margin is, in the context of a FC, the ultimate measure of cost imposed to members
including both production and transaction governance costs. The smaller this margin, the higher (lower)
will be the rates that FC will pay (charge) to its net saver (borrower) members. This margin must cover
all other expenses incurred by the FC. This intermediation margin is smaller for caisses populaires than
for credit unions except for the largest group. What these diﬀerences suggest is that U.S. members-clients,
while exposed to lower transaction costs tied to the governance structure in the network, may be exposed to
higher production costs and/or to higher EP by managers than members of Quebec FC. Since the margin
contains all costs related to production and governance, the Quebec system appears to perform better than
the U.S. credit union system. Thus—and in contradiction to opponents of network structures— for the average
member, the average cost of running the Quebec complex network is less than the cost or running a system
47F-statistic of Chow test of Canadian versus U.S. observations (comparing a restricted model using both countries simul-
taneously and an unrestricted model estimating two separated regressions) is 126.37 and passes to 75.94 when including size
dummies. Both statistics demonstrate data is not poolable at the 1% level. We then perform a similar test for size groups
(Restricted model estimates all size groups simultaneously, while unrestricted model estimate ﬁve diﬀerent regressions) and
obtain F-statistics of 6.45 and 1.86 when excluding and including size dummies, respectively. Both statistics are signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
19of non-integrated FC over the whole range of sizes except the largest.48 These preliminary observations
are consistent with the main hypothesis of higher eﬃciency in FC members of a network, in particular on
lower overall costs of intermediation and control of EP. We formalize the concepts of performance in terms
of X-eﬃciency and EP below .
5.1 X-eﬃciency
We present results of estimation related to Equation 1 in Panels A and B of Table VI. A few comments
on model estimation. Table V present three alternative models and diagnostics of including 47, 24 and 0
trigonometric terms respectively. We see that inclusion of trigonometric terms improves adjusted R−square
marginally, passing from 96.0% to 96.5% (Panel B). The beneﬁt of introducing FF terms is to impose more
stringent tests on the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients. In eﬀect, a reduction of F-statistics related to exclusion
tests is observed when FF terms are added into the model (Panel C). For example, usual homogeneity of
input prices hypothesis (Awi = Axi = Ay = 0) is rejected with a F-statistic of 329.9 if we do not include FF
terms (H=0 column), but with a F-statistic of only 33.7 if we include 47 FF terms. All exclusion tests are
rejected at the 1% level. While most of these tests are of marginal interest in this study we present them
for comparability with previous studies and to provide technically minded readers the elements to judge the
estimates. In particular, we note that the ratio of pass-due loans over net loans is also very signiﬁcantly
related to cost eﬃciency, conﬁrming recent empirical results for joint stock banks. Our size dummies and
FF terms are also very signiﬁcant.
The residues of the model were subject to an ANOVA to determine whether latent individual or time
eﬀects remained. The analysis revealed that no individual eﬀect remained with an F-test value of 0.879. We
could not reject the hypothesis of no latent individual eﬀects in the residues even after eliminating all group-
size dummies and FF-terms. The high adjusted R-squared of even the simplest model, the reasonable DW
and absence of multicolinearity suggests that the model explains very well the dependent variable. We did,
however, ﬁnd a very strong time eﬀect with an F-test value of 596.6, despite the presence of a trend variable,
suggesting that E[X | τ.] 6= 0. Although somewhat unusual in panel data with many individuals and few
time periods, the presence of latent time eﬀect may be explained by the absence in the regression of any
explanatory variable that may capture time-related shocks that are not monotonic —like the trend variable.
Thus we were forced to adjust our data accordingly by deducting the average over all individuals for each
period—a ﬁxed eﬀect adjustment. As noted before we also used a Hausman test to check whether a random
or a ﬁxed eﬀect estimation procedure should be used. Rejection of the hypothesis of equality of parameters
with a very high F-test (12389.9) suggested unambiguously the need to use a ﬁxed eﬀect approach. Thus the
ﬁnal model used to compute all results that follow is one estimate using a time-related ﬁxed eﬀect adjustment
with adjustment for time eﬀects and no adjustment for individual eﬀects.49 Finally, a few comments on
the use of size-group dummies. In the presence of a sample that does not change with time and the need to
use a individual related ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation procedure, such dummies would not be identiﬁed. We would
then be unable to check whether the size-groups of FC display diﬀerent cost functions. However, our sample
is not constant in size with several units switching group throughout the period. Further, given that no
correction for latent individual ﬁxed eﬀect was necessary, we are fully justiﬁed, from the statistical point of
view, to use size group dummies.
Panel A of Table VI presents mean individual X-eﬃciency scores in their usual presentation. It is
interesting to note that even after controlling for 161 parameters and ignoring shifts in the intercept that
capture intrinsic diﬀerences between the groups (governance and size), Quebec FC are still marginally more
eﬃcient than their U.S. counterparts except for the two smallest groups. In order to replicate most studies
that do not include size dummies (GR1,...,GR9), we add the impact of size group to our individual eﬀect
48Monopoly arguments cannot be invoked in this case. Both systems often operate where no other ﬁnancial institution is
available. On the contrary, U.S. FC are probably much more exposed to competition from small private local banks and mutual
or private Savings and Loan Associations. In Quebec, competition by the six large banks can be felt only in urban centers.
This also ignores the fact that the average Quebec caisse populaire oﬀers to members a considerably larger range of ﬁnancial
services than a United States credit union.
49It may be added that the correction for time eﬀect changed considerably results. Before this adjustment, EOS and X-
eﬃciency displayed a clear trend—e.g. towards higher X-eﬃciency. This trend disappeared with the time eﬀect adjustment, as
results below will show.
20error (presented in Panel A) and obtain a clearer image of the relative X-eﬃciency of Quebec and U.S. FC.50
Quebec FC present X-eﬃciency scores between 83.73% and 92.59%, while U.S. FC show considerably lower
ratios, between 78.66% and 86.14%. These results are presented in Panel B of Table VI. In Figures 2 and
3w ed i s p l a yﬁrst-order stochastic dominance diagrams. Diagrams in Figure 2 and 3 correspond to Panel A
and B respectively. There, it can be seen that even for size-groups that display very close mean measures of
X-eﬃciency —e.g. the group 5-10M— the Quebec FC stochastically dominate throughout the range. Results
are consistent with H2. We also ﬁnd support for H3, that diﬀerences in eﬃciency between member and non
member FC will increase with the size of the institution.
5.2 Expense preference
Table VII presents results for the formal EP tests based on Mester for large FC. We performed tests 1 to
3o f[ M e s t e r ,1989] (pp. 486-488) to check whether both groups of institutions (small and large) in each
system present diﬀerent cost functions. Test 1 veriﬁes whether linearity in input prices is veriﬁed for the
group of proﬁt maximizers (small FC in our case). As these institutions are assumed to be cost minimizers,
we estimate cost share equations and ﬁnd that linearity of input prices is not veriﬁed, i.e. that all cross
coeﬃcients related to wi(Ln(wiwj)a n dLn(yiwj)) are signiﬁcant at the level of 1% . We conclude that
intercept is thus not valid.51 As Test 1 refutes a cost function linear in input prices, we need not estimate
Test 2.52 Estimation of Test 3 (equivalent to test 2 but without the assumption of linearity of input prices)
requires the estimation of the cost function for both groups and the estimation of the diﬀerence in costs
between cost minimizing and expenser FC. Once this diﬀerence is obtained, it is regressed over the input
quantities and prices, and output quantities. If both cost functions are similar, coeﬃcients would be non-
signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that all parameters are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, thus concluding that cost functions
of both categories are not similar, and that one must use the Mester’s general tests for the presence of
separable (zi) and joint (ρi) EP. Both processes are evaluated with the estimation of a cost function for cost
minimizers, and then estimation of the cost function of expensers with a unique shift parameter including all
variables associated to EP (labor and ﬁxed assets in our case). A shift parameter (ρi)s i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 (1) in the case of separable (joint) EP, implies that expensers eﬀectively use more of the inputs than
a cost minimizer. We observe that the shift parameter zi is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
both inputs and both systems. We also observe that joint expense preference ρi is are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one in both systems, but in one case (DM) it is below, and in the other (USCU) it is above one. In
all four cases (for zi and ρi and for labor and ﬁxed assets) coeﬃcients for the USCU are considerably larger
than those for the DM. This is consistent with H3 that over a range of large FC, diﬀerences in EP between
members and non-members of networks will be relatively large.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of ﬁnancial cooperatives (FC). It consists
of two parts. The ﬁrst part presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost economics
(TCE) that seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. In particular we
seek to explain integration of large numbers of FC into large networks that present speciﬁc features common
to many countries. The second part consists of an empirical study that compares two systems of FC, the
United States credit unions system (USCU) and the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM).
50The pure error used usually for the estimation of X-eﬃciency (Panel B) is obtained after adjusting he regression for the
size eﬀect. It is clear that if the dummy is not included, these errors would be much larger—but the slope coeﬃcients would
be biased. If a particular size group would display larger positive (negative) error, the inclusion of the dummy will yield a
coeﬃcient that is positive (negative). Thus, when we correct for the dummy in the computation of the X-eﬃciency (Panel C)
we are just adjusting for the reduction of the error forced through the inclusion of the dummy.
51The intercept test compares average cost of the two groups. One would say that a group is more cost-eﬃcient if the intercept
is signiﬁcantly greater than the intercept of the other group. This test is valid only if one can demonstrate that both groups
have statistically similar cost functions, i.e. that each coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between one group and the other,
and that both groups show similar statistical characteristics (variance and covariance of variables).
52Despite the results of Test 1, we estimated equation 8 (p.488) of Mester (assuming linearity of costs in input prices) and
found that all parameters are statistically diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level, invalidating the hypothesis of similar cost functions.
21The fundamental proposition is that networks, particularly strategic networks, are a superior form of
governance mechanism (over markets and mergers) for relatively wide and relevant ranges of contractual
hazard and size of the institutions. Another central theoretical proposition generated by the analysis is that
strategic networks provide a substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution
dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and
possibly economizing on bounded rationality both occurring in large FC. The theoretical portion allows us
to generate a set of refutable propositions that can be formulated as follows: (i) Over ranges of contractual
hazard that are very small one can expect to see institutions that remain independent or tied up in only very
loose arrangement while conserving a relatively high level of eﬃciency. This is the typical situation of many
developing countries in which FC is an incipient sector oﬀering only very basic ﬁnancial services, which is
often all the community they serve needs. (ii) For higher levels of contractual hazard, networks become the
optimal form of organization. Thus, for similar level of contractual hazard FC operating in networks should
display higher levels of X-eﬃciency and lower variance is the size of institutions than FC not members of
networks. This is so because FC members of networks solve the economies of scale imperative through joint
productions and adopt a cost eﬃcient governance structure. (iii) Since risk of EP is positively related to size
of the institution (due to limits on governance and lack of separation of functions), over a range of large FC,
diﬀerences in X-eﬃciency and EP between members and non-members of networks will be relatively large.
(iv) Under both growth strategies (merger or network based) FC created by mergers that resulted from the
exercise of EP should present lower X-eﬃciency and higher EP.
In the empirical portion of the paper we tested hypothesis (ii) and (iii). We ﬁnd that DM based FC
present overall higher eﬃciency than USCU. The diﬀerence in eﬃciency increases with the size of the insti-
tutions. Also, large USCU present considerably higher expense preference that equally sized DM FC. These
results are consistent with our central theoretical proposition that strategic networks provide a substitute,
hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms
thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and possibly economizing on bounded rational-
ity. Opponents to networks often argued that running the Desjardins’ strategic network system is expensive.
Thus that the beneﬁts associated to the vast array of ﬁnancial services oﬀered to large sectors of the popula-
tion and in particular to rural communities comes at a heavy price. The data suggest that, yes, the success
of the DM is servicing its vast and rural clientele comes at a price. But, even paying that price, the evidence
provided by the measures of X-eﬃciency and expense preference indicates that the DM outperforms the
USCU system.
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26< 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-50M >50M Total
N 875 1053 1647 1262 1029 5866
% of total 15% 18% 28% 22% 18% 100%
Total assets 3 184 7 294 16 434 33 841 68 755 17 936
Median deposit by employee 886 1 123 1 247 1 369 1 455 1 247
Median loan by employee 917 1 117 1 264 1 329 1 438 1 248
Loans/Administrative costs 34 38 42 43 46 41
Deposits/Loans 97,5% 99,8% 99,0% 103,2% 100,1% 100,1%
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,70% 1,20% 1,42% 1,40% 1,31% 1,30%
Real intermediation margin /Loans 4,81% 4,01% 3,75% 3,45% 3,35% 3,75%
< 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-50M >50M Total
N 815 964 1596 1299 1193 5867
% of total 14% 16% 27% 22% 20% 100%
Total assets 3 291 7 490 16 381 34 672 71 949 19 367
Median deposit by employee 1 104 1 382 1 557 1 590 1 711 1 498
Median loan by employee 851 1 011 1 129 1 191 1 266 1 118
Loans/Administrative costs 24 24 26 26 27 26
Deposits/Loans 126,1% 130,4% 133,6% 130,4% 130,6% 130,8%
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,33% 0,77% 1,48% 2,00% 2,22% 1,46%
Real intermediation margin /Loans 4,86% 4,24% 3,83% 3,63% 3,25% 3,81%
< 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-50M >50M Total
N 26816 9561 10514 5853 7898 60642
% of total 44% 16% 17% 10% 13% 100%
Total assets 1 537 6 962 15 422 34 289 107 160 6 337
Median deposit by employee 889 1 389 1 534 1 562 1 760 1 307
Median loan by employee 681 1 018 1 138 1 172 1 341 986
Loans/Administrative costs 25 25 26 26 28 26
Deposits/Loans 128,5% 132,5% 132,3% 130,6% 129,6% 130,3%
Fixed assets/Total assets 0,17% 0,64% 1,53% 2,09% 2,09% 0,62%
Real intermediation margin /Loans 4,73% 4,12% 3,93% 3,87% 3,48% 4,13%
Table I
Description of Data (1)
French Canadian Caisses Populaires
(1)   December 31, 2001 dollars, All monetary units were divided by 1000 in the regressions, 
Source: Confédération des Caisses Desjardins, National Credit Union Association,
Median Figures (1996-2000)
Complete Sample of American Credit Unions













1996 208 3 100 238 7 409 370 16 372 269 33 539 197 65 891 1 282 16 570
1997 191 3 076 227 7 321 362 16 111 273 33 612 188 66 355 1 241 17 073
1998 185 3 296 210 7 066 363 16 286 259 33 393 200 67 535 1 217 17 536
1999 157 3 207 213 7 248 318 16 741 236 33 683 217 69 100 1 141 18 487
2000 134 3 306 165 7 367 234 16 841 225 35 210 227 74 637 985 21 626














1996 192 3 280 221 7 586 363 16 424 279 33 814 227 67 571 1 282 17 978
1997 174 3 219 218 7 481 357 16 382 270 34 971 222 69 354 1 241 18 101
1998 165 3 291 198 7 378 337 16 365 269 35 299 249 72 731 1 218 19 313
1999 147 3 433 186 7 497 300 16 328 258 34 801 250 73 230 1141 20613
2000 137 3 390 141 7 501 239 16 257 223 35 350 245 75 035 985 22 308
1996-2000 815 3 291 964 7 490 1596 16 381 1299 34 672 1193 71 949 5867 19 367
(1)   December 31, 2001 dollars. All monetary units were divided by 1000 in the regressions. 
Source: Confédération des Caisses Desjardins, National Credit Union Association.
Median Figures
Size-Paired American Credit Unions
< 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-50M
Table II
Growth of Financial Cooperatives Through Time  (1)
1996-2000
French Canadian Caisses Populaires
>50M Total
>50M Total < 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-50MSymbol Definition  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
C
Real total costs, in thousands US$, deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with 1995 as the 
base year. 1 223 5 325 0 434 218 367 2 796 4 737 18 1 473 116 005
Symbol Definition  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
W1 Real annual, ex post interest rate on deposits and dividend rate on shares, in percentage. 1,84% 1,97% 0,00% 0,92% 24,00% 4,48% 3,67% 0,00% 3,73% 24,00%
W2 Real wage rate, in US$ by equivalent full-time employee and deflated by the CPI.  26 070 6 680 5 980 24 540 69 360 30 515 8 764 0 29 894 118 963
W3 Real occupancy expenses, defined as occupancy expenses divided by fixed assets, in percentage. 47,96% 237,95% 0,00% 24,07% 8491,60% 2920,76% 56122,22% 0,00% 50,15% 2252000,00%
Symbol Definition  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
X1 Deposits and shares, in thousands US$, deflated by the CPI. 24 110 36 991 0 14 466 1 234 902 27 923 45 798 255 16 730 1 767 794
X2
In Québec, the number of equivalent full-time employees is defined by the total number of hours 
worked each week divided by 33,5 hours a week. In U.S. we rather used the sum of full-time 
employees and half the sum of part-time employees. 15 19 1 8 176 14 20 1 8 556
X3 Amount of fixed assets, in thousands US$, deflated by the CPI. 406 573 0 244 15 038 676 1 143 0 264 31 661
Symbol Definition  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
Y Loans, in thousands US$, deflated by the CPI. 23 864 37 734 0 14 654 1 348 081 20 940 36 470 39 12 152 1 422 629
Symbol Definition  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
CRR Total delinquent loans / Total loans 1,56% 3,15% 0,03% 1,30% 178,58% 1,46% 1,96% 0,00% 1,00% 63,11%
CAP Total equity / Total assets 17,97% 8,87% 0,03% 15,34% 99,99% 13,02% 4,60% -14,17% 12,28% 54,94%
ACQ Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the institution acquired another one, 0 elsewhere. 17,99% 8,94% 0,02% 15,35% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
GR1 American CU with real assets between 5 and 10 millions. 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 14,65% 35,36% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00%
GR2 American CU with real assets between 10 and 25 millions. 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 24,26% 42,87% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00%
GR3 American CU with real assets between 25 and 50 millions. 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 19,74% 39,81% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00%
GR4 American CU with real assets above 50 millions. 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 18,13% 38,53% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00%
GR5 Canadian CU  100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
GR6 Canadian CU with real assets between 5 and 10 millions. 16,00% 36,67% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
GR7 Canadian CU with real assets between 10 and 25 millions. 25,03% 43,32% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
GR8 Canadian CU with real assets between 25 and 50 millions. 19,18% 39,37% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
GR9 Canadian CU with real assets above 50 millions. 15,64% 36,33% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Table III
(1)   December 31, 2001 dollars. All monetary units were divided by 1000 in the regressions. To avoid extreme observations, we had to limit the interest rate on deposits at 24%, which is the usurary rate in Canada.
Canada United States
Definition of variables and their basic characteristics (1)
United States
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables - Input prices
Independent Variables - Input quantities
Independent Variables - Output quantities
Source: Confédération des Caisses Desjardins, National Credit Union Association.
1996-2000





 min i = sample minimum value of input price i=1,2,3,4.
w
 max
 i = sample maximum value of input price i=1,2,3,4.
x
 min
 i = sample minimum value of input quantity i=1,2,3,4.
x
 max
 i = sample maximum value of input quantity i=1,2,3,4.
y
 min
 = sample minimum value of ouput quantity
y
 max
 = sample maximum value of ouput quantity 
S wi = 0,00001 - Ln w 
min 
i
S xi = 0,00001 - Ln x 
min 
i Scale factor Mean value (1)
S yi = 0,00001 - Ln y 
min 
j l  0,410
M = sample maximum value of Ln w 
max
i + S wi x1 1,956
l = 6/M x2 2,598
xi = 6/[Ln x 
max
i + S xi), i =1,2,3,4. x3 4,196
m = 6/[Ln y 
max
 + S y), j =1,2. m 2,015
Symbol  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
(Lnw1+Sw1) l 0,494 0,277 0,000 0,600 1,320
(Lnw2+Sw2) l 3,228 0,282 0,000 3,244 4,977
(Lnw3+Sw3) l 1,557 0,505 0,000 1,426 6,000
Symbol  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
(Lnx1+Sx1) x1 l 2,246 0,809 0,000 2,253 6,000
(Lnx2+Sx2) x2 l 1,608 1,128 0,000 1,603 6,000
(Lnx3+Sx3) x3 l 0,595 0,638 0,000 0,386 6,000
Symbol  Mean Std Dev. Minimum  Median Maximum
(Lny+Sy) m l 2,190 0,831 0,000 2,197 6,000
Table IV
Scale factors and scaled variables for the Fourier flexible cost 
equations
Independent Variables - Input prices
Independent Variables - Input quantities
Independent Variables - Output quantities
Scale Factors





(1) We present the results of a simple scaling process considering simultaneously both countries and all years. We 
also considered disaggregated analyses by country and year, but obtained similar results. These results are available 








Model (2): H=47 H=24 H=0  
N. obs. 11 035 11 035 11 035
N.obs.
2/3 496 496 496




Model: H=47 H=24 H=0
H0:         Awi = Axi = Ay = 0     (3)
F-statistic 33,70 321,61 329,93
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:        bT = AT = 0      (4)
F-statistic 254,91 198,36 197,30
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:        bCRR = bCAP = 0     (5)
20,37 20,70 23,93
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:        bCRR = 0    
F-statistic 15,42 16,95 17,43
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:        bCAP = 0     
F-statistic 25,37 24,54 30,03
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:        bGRi = AGRi = 0     (6)
F-statistic 53,67 90,27 91,13
p-value 0,000 0,000 0,000
H0:       uh=vh=0,  for all h    (2)
F-statistic 37,44 5,95 NA
p-value 0,000 0,000
H0:        uh=vh=0,  for h>24    (2)
F-statistic 61,97 NA NA
p-value 0,000
(3) Test of homogeneity of input prices hypothesis Awi and Axi include all cross terms of input prices.
(4) Exclusion test of technical trend coefficients including both the coefficient related to trend variable (bT) and all its 
cross terms (AT). 
(5) Exclusion test of both credit risk and capital coefficients.
(6) Exclusion test of size groups coefficients including both the coefficient related to size groups (bGRi) and all its cross 
terms (AGRi). 
Source: Confédération des Caisses Desjardins, National Credit Union Association.
1996-2000
(1) The reader is referred to the production approach of Mitchell and Onvural (1996) for further details on the model. We 
limit our analysis to 50 FF terms, though we noted that Eastwood and Gallant (1991) recommend to use a number of 
parameter near the number of observations raised to the two thirds power, 496 in our case. We understand that addition 
of additional FF terms should further lower our F-statistics.
C. Exclusion tests 
Canada
        H=47 Hypothesis:        H0: uh=vh=0,  for h>47
        H=24 Hypothesis:        H0: uh=vh=0,  for h>24
        H=0   Hypothesis:        H0: uh=vh=0,  for all h
(2) As presented in Gallant (1982), H refers to half the number of Fourier coefficients.
Table V
Hypothesis tests
B. Characteristics of models
A. Equation 
(1)




11[uhcos(xi+xj)+vhsin(xi+xj)]  +   Σh=12
17[uhcos(xi-xj)+vhsin(xi-xj)]   +Sh=18
23[uhcos(wi-wj)+vhsin(wi-wj)]
     +Σh=24
29[uhcos(wi-wj+yi)+vhsin(wi-wj+yi)]+Σh=30
35[uhcos(wi-wj-yi)+vhsin(wi-wj-yi)]
      i,j=1,…,3; i≠j ∀ w, x     i,j=1 ∀ y
   +Σh=36
41[uhcos(wi+wj-yi)+vhsin(wi+wj-yi)]   +Sh=42
47[uhcos(wi+wj+yi)+vhsin(wi+wj+yi)]1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1996- 
2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1996- 
2000
< 5M 72,55% 71,96% 68,24% 72,92% 77,80% 72,31% 79,54% 70,48% 67,80% 70,21% 73,31% 72,52%
5-10M 71,04% 71,73% 69,18% 74,66% 75,76% 72,30% 77,21% 70,05% 68,44% 72,50% 73,99% 72,39%
10-25M 70,81% 73,90% 71,56% 75,91% 69,00% 72,44% 75,44% 69,61% 68,97% 74,84% 73,56% 72,39%
25-50M 71,57% 72,34% 71,02% 84,39% 64,75% 72,66% 73,74% 68,91% 69,22% 77,06% 73,38% 72,41%
>50M 73,17% 70,34% 70,48% 96,01% 58,33% 73,71% 72,08% 68,23% 70,15% 79,32% 72,72% 72,59%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1996- 
2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1996- 
2000
< 5M 83,35% 83,86% 84,47% 83,71% 83,06% 83,73% 77,82% 79,00% 79,33% 78,98% 78,29% 78,66%
5-10M 86,23% 84,67% 85,01% 85,51% 85,52% 85,39% 83,53% 84,60% 84,83% 84,19% 84,17% 84,26%
10-25M 88,97% 84,52% 84,80% 89,53% 90,82% 87,51% 83,70% 84,59% 84,63% 83,71% 83,60% 84,08%
25-50M 91,17% 86,36% 86,40% 90,95% 94,41% 88,76% 84,30% 85,05% 84,93% 83,73% 83,08% 84,26%
>50M 92,71% 89,74% 89,48% 92,14% 97,96% 92,59% 86,27% 86,87% 86,70% 85,35% 85,58% 86,14%
Source: Confédération des Caisses Desjardins, National Credit Union Association.
EFF =  (є
Min
i+bGRPi*GRPi)/ (єi+bGRPi*GRPi)




  i,j=1,…,4; i≠j
Equation 














Panel B: X-efficiency including size group adjustment
Canada United States
Table VI
Mean Performance MeasuresPANEL A:
Complete 
sample Quebec United States
Complete 
sample Quebec United States
z 0,125 0,259 *** 1,940 *** 2,831** 0,678 *** 20,048 ***
Std Dev. 0,19 0,0128 0,205 1,401 0,0337 3,902
R-squared: 0,921 0,854 0,961 0,956 0,859 0,799
Durbin Watso 1,636 1,995 1,53 1,586 2,007 1,595
Number of ob 6512 3286 3226 6504 3286 4693
PANEL B:
Complete 
sample Quebec United States
Complete 
sample Quebec United States
r 1,198*** 0,5669 *** 1,364 *** 0,818*** 0,575 *** 1,387 ***
Std Dev. 0,002 0,021 0,003 0,002 0,019 0,004
R-squared: 0,7461 0,865 0,69 0,925 0,86 0,958
Durbin Watso 1,678 1,994 1,37 1,666 2,008 1,38
Number of ob 6512 3286 3226 6512 3286 3226
***: Significant at 1%.
**: Significant at 5%.
*: Significant at 10%.
Labor Factor Capital Factor
Note: This table shows the coefficients for expense preference parameters defined in equations 10 
Table VII
Expense preference test for institutions with diffuse ownership
Labor Factor Capital FactorFigure 2
 X-efficiency
EFF =  єMini/ єiFigure 3
X-efficiency including size group adjustment
EFF =  (єMini+bGRPi*GRPi)/ (єi+bGRPi*GRPi)